

JPRS 76604

10 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2198



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

10 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2198

CONTENTS

AFGHANISTAN

Discord Within Karmal Government Reported (MASHRIQ, 23 Jul 80)	1
Briefs	
Karmal Trip Cancellation Mystery	3
Doctors Reject Russian Wounded	3

IRAN

Briefs	
Sistan, Baluchistan New Roads	4

IRAQ

Exile Discusses Kurdish Struggle in Iraq, Iran (Ismat Sharif Wanli Interview; AVANTI, 20 Sep 80).	5
Autonomous Region Legislative Council Elections Concluded (INA, 20 Sep 80)	8
Deputy RCC Chairman on Relations With Italy, Turkey (Izzat Ibrahim; AL-JUMHURIYAH, 16 Sep 80)	10
Official Criticizes Communist Party's National Stance (Hashim 'Agrawi Interview; ATH-THAMRAH, 12 Sep 80).	12

ISRAEL

Arab Majority Seen Trying To Organize Politically (Kassim Zay; AL HAMISHMAR, 1 Aug 80)	14
Peres Prepares Plan To Reduce Inflation, Spur Economy (Yosef Pri'el; DAVAR, 28 Jul 80)	18

Galili Appointment To Platform Committee Analyzed (Shud Ulmarat; HA'ARETZ, 30 Jul 80)	20
Details Reported on Gaza Mayor's Attitude Toward Egypt (Various sources, 22 Sep 80)	23
Refusal To Host Egyptian Ambassador Rejects Autonomy Without Palestinian State	
Briefs	
Arrest of W. Bank Mayor	25
IDF Arms to Terrorists, Criminals	25
LEBANON	
Significance of Phalange Offensive Against NLP Discussed (Yusuf Ibrahim al-Asmar; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, various dates)	27
Review of Past Developments Analysis of Anticipated Events	
Shiite Leader Discusses Trip to Iran, Problem of South Lebanon (Shaykh Muhammad Shams al-Din Interview; AL-HAWADITH, 27 Jun 80)	46
Briefs	
Radar Detection of Terrorists	56
MAURITANIA	
Briefs	
Decisions Affecting Public Corporations	57
SYRIA	
Socialist Federation Official Discusses Domestic Threats (Khalil al-Taqi; AL-QABAS, 13 Jul 80)	58
Internal Security Seen as Government's Top Priority (AL-HAWADITH, 18 Jul 80)	64
Briefs	
Japanese Vehicles	67

TUNISIA

Agriculture Is Pronounced Top National Priority (LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 31 Aug 80)	68
Youth Urged To Contribute to Party Objectives (LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE, 2 Sep 80)	71

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Briefs	
Interior Ministry News	73

WESTERN SAHARA

Briefs	
SAWR Fighters Claim Victories	74

DISCORD WITHIN KARMAL GOVERNMENT REPORTED

Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 23 Jul 80 pp 1, 7

[Article: "Two Karmal Opponents Hanged; Many Officials Mysteriously Disappear From Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul, 22 July (BBC Radio report)--Major battles are being fought between the Mujahidin and the Russian army in Nangarhar, Asmar, Paktia and other places. The Mujahidin claim that they have surrounded the Afghan army in Asmar and have destroyed many tanks and armored cars in Nangarhar. At the same time, the Russian air force is bombing Afghan villages recklessly. Hundreds of houses have been destroyed in Nangarhar province by this bombing.

Meanwhile, the Babrak Karmal government is experiencing discord within its own ranks. The minister of the interior has been arrested. Two anti-government activists have been hung. Another 10 have been sent to jail.

According to TASS, 12 opponents of the Karmal government have been jailed by a revolutionary court. They were accused of murdering six pro-government people, illegal possession of firearms, and anti-government activities. They were also accused of distributing anti-government pamphlets and having connections with foreign agents. According to TASS, tanks have been stationed on the bridge on River Kabul in order to strengthen Karmal's position. Artillery has been installed on all roads going out of Kabul.

According to diplomatic sources, purges on a large scale have been ordered.

Russian war planes have bombed many villages in Nangarhar province destroying hundreds of homes. The Mujahidin claim that they have destroyed many Russian tanks and armored vehicles in Nangarhar. They have also captured a jeep and attacked the Jalalabad airport where they destroyed three helicopters and six tanks. They killed 20 Afghan and five Russian soldiers. A battle has been raging for many days in Asmar. The Mujahidin have surrounded the Russian army in one place. The Mujahidin claim that they have killed 50 Russians in this battle. According to one announcement by the Mujahidin, more than 500,000 people have been killed since Karmal came to power.

According to PPI, Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan has announced in a press release that the Mujahidin are fighting the Russians fiercely in (Kinha?) province. In this battle, 12 local communists were killed in addition to a large number of Russian soldiers. An armored vehicle and a military truck of the enemy were destroyed. According to a report from Pikita, the Mujahidin barricaded a road in (Hani) Khel and burned a Russian tank which was protecting a company of Russian soldiers.

7997

CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

KARMAL TRIP CANCELLATION MYSTERY--Peshawar, 19 July--Afghanistan's president, Babrak Karmal, who was being sent to Moscow for 2 weeks by the Russians, was made to return from the airport. When Karmal arrived at the airport to leave for Moscow, he was whisked back to the People's House in a military vehicle. It has not been disclosed why he was being sent to Moscow, or why his trip was cancelled. [Text] [Quetta JANG in Urdu 20 Jul 80 p 1] London, 22 July--According to diplomatic sources, the head of the pro-Soviet puppet government of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, was rushed back from the airport because of a heart attack. The Russian authorities took Karmal to a hospital where he was specially treated by Russian doctors for 1 week. He was transferred to the presidential mansion, the People's House, after his treatment. It is said that when President Karmal got out of his car to board the plane for Moscow, he fainted. He was rushed to the hospital in a car. He is being treated at the People's House. [Text] [Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 23 Jul 80 pp 3, 8] 7997

DOCTORS REJECT RUSSIAN WOUNDED--London, 22 July (MNI)--Teachers and students at the Medical College in Jalalabad have refused to treat wounded Russians. About 30 Russians were taken there recently for treatment, but the doctors refused to see them. The Russians closed the Jalalabad Medical College in retaliation. All doctors and teachers were ordered out of the hospital. Twelve teachers and 15 doctors were arrested. They are being accused of inciting other doctors and teachers against the Russian regime. Some 8,000 more Afghan families have entered Pakistan as a result of the continuing war in Afghanistan. According to Doctor Fazil Mohammad, president of Hizb-e-Islami of Nangarhar, these refugees came from Deh Pala, Miznia, Ispola and Kot. Their villages were destroyed by Russian bombing. Hundreds of children, old people and women were killed in these bombings. These refugees succeeded in making it to Pakistan, saving their own lives. [Text] [Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 23 Jul 80 p 3] 7997

BRIEFS

SISTAN, BALUCHISTAN NEW ROADS--Tehran (Pars).--A spokesman of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation has announced the following: Roadbuilding and expansion operations are being carried out on a continuous basis in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan and, at present, secondary roads are being pushed forward through Delgan, Bampur, Khash, Zaboli, Paskuh, Suzan, Zahedan, Cheshmen, Ziarat, Suran and Saravan as well as part of the Hashak-KENARAK road--altogether totaling 525 kilometers and costing 4.85 billion rials. They will begin service shortly. This report states that the General Department of Roads and Transportation of the Province of Sistan and Baluchistan is building rural roads in that province so that work on them will be completed before winter comes and they can be used by the inhabitants. At present, about 342 kilometers of rural roads are being built in this area by crews of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation so that the final stages have already been completed and they can be put into use shortly. The spokesman added: Construction work on the main roads of Torbat-e Heydariyeh - Birjand - Zahedan (443 kilometers), Shurgaz - Zahedan - Mirjaveh (156 kilometers), and the junction road of Zahedan-Birjand-Zabol (128 kilometers) is being carried out by contractors and will be completed shortly. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Sep 80 p 14]

CSO: 4906

EXILE DISCUSSES KURDISH STRUGGLE IN IRAQ, IRAN

LD251121 Rome AVANTI in Italian 20 Sep 80 p 9

[Interview with 'Ismat Sharif Wanli, exiled Kurdish leader, by Mirella Galletti: "It Is My People Who Must Decide About Their Resources and Their Future"--"some weeks ago" in Italy]

[Text] A small man with a thin face which still bears the scars of an attack carried out by Iraqi "diplomats" in Lusanne 4 years ago. He is 'Ismat Sharif Wanli, a Kurdish leader who has been living in exile for years, sometimes holding delicate diplomatic posts. For a long time he was Mullah Mustafa Barzani's representative in Europe. About a year ago he founded the "Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party" which, according to its political adversaries, has little following in Kurdistan. But with his work as scholar and politician, Wanli is one of the prominent figures in the Kurdish National Movement. The interview took place some weeks ago during Wanli's visit to Italy.

[Question] What are the reasons which prompted you to found the party Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party?

[Answer] The Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party differs from the other Kurdish parties in two respects. The first is that the latter regard themselves as the repositories of the people's will and refuse the autonomy offered by the central governments. We, on the other hand, do not want to make other people's decisions but intend to create the conditions so that the Kurds can choose the kind of solution that they prefer--autonomy, independence or a union with other national groups.

The second aspect is that our party addresses itself to all Kurds, since the Kurds constitute a single nationality, for instance the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is represented in all the strata into which Kurdistan is subdivided, but the Iranian KDP has a different strategy and different aims from the Iraqi KDP.

The Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party, however, has a single leadership though obviously the organization is different for each area of Kurdistan. It is a progressive socialist party with a social program, but it is not Marxist-Leninist.

[Question] What is the strategy of the Kurdish movement as a whole?

[Answer] The first objective is for the Kurds not to be dependent on the ruling fascist and chauvinist governments in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. There is now a natural convergence of interests among the Kurds and oppressed people of the other nationalities. They want an administration capable of exploiting Kurdistan's resources for the benefit of the Kurdish people and reject the power politics pursued by the central governments. But the governments' nationalism is so deeprooted that it will take time to attenuate the extremist stances.

The Kurds are prohibited from enjoying their own country's natural resources and every method is being tried to eliminate their desire for unity. Why should the Kurds not be united among themselves instead of with Arabs, Persians and Turks, as they are at present?

[Question] You visited Iran immediately after the victory of the Iranian revolution. After a year what can you say about the situation of the Kurds in Iran?

[Answer] Khomeyni had the merit of expelling the monarchy. But we must not forget that the Iranian revolution was carried out by the Iranians, in the plural. Khomeyni played a major role but the mass demonstration against the shah took place not only in Tehran but throughout the country and above all in Kordestan. The imam himself acknowledged this activity when he congratulated the Iranian Kurds during his exile in France.

During these struggles the shared hope was to gain from the revolution freedom and guarantees for the solution of the problems of the national minorities.

But the Iranian peoples' revolution was confiscated. By a theocratic and fanatical government which manipulates the unemployed as an oppression force against the people. The notorious Pasdaran.

There is no democracy now in Iran. The freedom of the press is more and more limited. The social and economic problems remain unresolved and the minorities' problems have not been resolved. Iran is composed of a mosaic of peoples and a federation would be a solution to this state of affairs. Instead Khomeyni wants to unite the Muslims and rejects this solution. The imam does not belong to this century and it is not a matter of being against Islam. The present Iranian government will not last long.

[Question] Press rumors have reported that Iraqi KDP Chairman Masud Barzani's Peshmerge is being helped by Khomeyni in the struggle against the Iranian Kurds. Can you elucidate?

[Answer] I would rather not talk about this. In general it can be said that there is a vicious circle in the Kurdish parties which are trying to gain advantages from the contradictions among the states to secure aid and conduct their struggle. It is a lamentable policy because the governments are manipulating the Kurdish movement. The result is the accentuation of the differences among Kurds.

What the Kurds are doing in Iran is positive. They have not lost the war. They have abandoned the cities to be able to wage guerrilla warfare in the hills. It is something new for Iran that there is open talk, especially among the opposition forces, of the problems connected with resolving the minorities' problems.

[LD251123] [Question] How do you assess the situation of the Kurds in Turkey?

[Answer] In that country there is convergence between the Kurds and the Turkish working class with regard to overthrowing fascism and reaction, which are the main obstacles to the Kurds' self-determination and to democracy in the country. I fear that the Western governments are making the same mistakes in Turkey as they made in Iran. They are giving the fascist government weapons to use against the population and trying to save the country from bankruptcy.

The Kurdish movement in Turkey is very active but also very divided. They must not make any mistakes and must identify who are their real friends.

[Question] What about Iraq?

[Answer] The situation of the Kurds in Iraq is the most tragic, on account of the Kurds' mass deportation. Over 700,000 Kurds have been deported to the country's southern and western areas. This means that one-fourth of the Kurdish population is dispersed and families have been split.

The autonomy given to Iraqi Kurdistan is a myth and the Kurdish parliament is a tool in the Baghdad government's hands. But now in Iraq we are witnessing the unity of the opposition. A national front has been formed, embracing the progressive Kurds of the "Patriotic Union of Kurdistan," the al-Nasirites, the communists and the Ba'th leftwing.

CSO: 4404

AUTONOMOUS REGION LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS CONCLUDED

JN201806 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1650 GMT 20 Sep 80

[Excerpts] Irbil, Autonomous Rule Center, 20 Sep (INA)--The results of the elections for the First Legislative Council of the Autonomous Region, which were held yesterday through direct, secret and free ballot, were announced here today.

A statement issued by 'Izzat Ibrahim, Revolution Command Council vice chairman and head of the higher commission supervising the elections, said that the elections were held with great awareness and large popular incentive and enthusiasm, which emphasized the rallying of our Kurdish people's masses around their revolutionary leadership.

The statement explained that this exercise of democracy was a lively expression of our people's awareness of their historic responsibilities and continuation in form and content of the exercise of democracy Iraq witnessed on 20 June to elect the council's members. [sentence as received]

The statement gave the names of 50 persons constituting the Legislative Council's members.

About 700,000 citizens took part in the Legislative Council's elections, held to elect 50 members from 194 candidates in 11 constituencies, which comprised 177 electoral centers distributed in the 3 autonomous rule governorates.

Under the Legislative Council law, the Legislative Council of the Autonomous Region will be in charge of drawing up and ratifying laws concerning the region's affairs and discussing its general budget.

The Legislative Council law has not permitted dual membership in the National Assembly and the Legislative Council, but has allowed the candidate who has not won in the National Assembly elections to renominate himself for the Legislative Council elections.

The Legislative Council will hold its meetings in Irbil City, center of the autonomous region. The council's term of office is 3 years.

This electoral process comes to complete the construction of the democratic institutions and to develop and deepen the exercise of democracy in Iraq.

CSO: 4802

DEPUTY RCC CHAIRMAN ON RELATIONS WITH ITALY, TURKEY

LD190915 Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 16 Sep 80 pp 1, 11

[Unattributed article on press conference held by 'Izzat Ibrahim, deputy chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council, in Rome on 15 September]

[Excerpts] Deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council 'Izzat Ibrahim has affirmed that Iraq and Italy have agreed on developing their relations on the basis of the interests of the two friendly countries' peoples.

Speaking at a press conference in Rome attended by a large number of Italian and international newspaper and news agency correspondents, he said: We hope that all the active and influential forces of the Italian people will participate with officials in Iraq and Italy to strengthen this policy and achieve its desired objectives, because cooperation between the two countries stems from the friendship between them and because of the geographical positions of Iraq and Italy. This friendship and cooperation are the great objective in the development of relations between the two countries, despite attempts by hostile forces to disrupt relations between their peoples.

He added: We strongly and effectively resist such activity whether by internal or external forces. The media in both countries must clarify this truth to the two friendly peoples who are struggling for their own interests out of their common desire--the desire that has been expressed by the Iraqi delegation's visit to Italy.

Ibrahim then reviewed the 17 July Revolution's achievements in mobilizing the masses and fostering cultural development on the basis of the principles of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party.

He said: On the basis of these principles we have established developed relations with Europe, particularly the countries which have shown considerable change in their policies toward our problems. Our clear and declared policy at this stage is evident in the adoption of an independent course and the strengthening of our relations, particularly with

Italy and France, because of the change in their attitude to our cause and the Palestine problem and of their response to our desire and ambition to develop our country culturally.

'Izzat Ibrahim said that Iraq's attitude to the transfer of technology and economic and military cooperation with Italy is increasingly clear and frank, in response to the sincere and frank Italian attitude and in the light of the development of the Italian situation.

He explained that Iraq will continue to supply Italy with oil within its capabilities and on the basis of honest friendship and cooperation and mutual benefits and interests. Accordingly, friendly relations involve obligations and rights. As far as we are concerned we have fulfilled our obligations. We also ask our friend to fulfill such obligations not on a one-for-one basis but in the general sense of our agreement.

Speaking about Iraqi-Turkish relations, the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council said that Iraq has no problems with Turkey and enjoys developed relations with it, relations that we respect very much just as Turkey respects our policy. Iraq has also extensive economic relations with Turkey. We look at the recent coup d'etat as primarily an internal matter, since Iraq believes in Turkey's need for political and social independence because it concerns us. We hope that the new regime will place Turkey in a better position.

CSO: 4802

OFFICIAL CRITICIZES COMMUNIST PARTY'S NATIONAL STANCE

LD191551 Baghdad ATH-THAWRAH in Arabic 12 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview with Hashim 'Agrawi, Iraqi minister of state and member of the National and Nationalist Progressive Front--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The higher committee of the National and Nationalist Progressive Front achieved important results during its recent meeting. The Front's higher committee approved the expulsion of the Iraqi Communist Party from the Front because of its numerous excesses and violations of the National Action Charter.

ATH-THAWRAH met with Hashim Hasan 'Agrawi, minister of state and member of the National and Nationalist Progressive Front, to discuss this matter. He said:

The Iraqi Communist Party joined the National and Nationalist Progressive Front not because it profoundly believed in the Front's aims and sought to promote the front's work and consolidate its democratic role in society. It joined the Front for a tactical political purpose and not on the basis of long-term strategy and horizons. This becomes clear by noting the Iraqi Communist Party members' conduct inside the Front. It can be said that the party tried to exploit the Front and its presence in the Front to achieve private aims and objectives inconsistent with the spirit of democratic action and the cohesion of the Front, which must be strengthened.

Exasperation began to show on the faces of the Communist Party representatives and in their behavior in the National Front when the Ba'th Party began to make efforts to implement the clauses of the National Action Charter and deservedly gained the leading position in the front. It is the Ba'th Party which founded the Front and proposed its charter out of its belief in the need for Front action and a Front role in serving the course of the revolution and consolidating its great achievements. Our masses were aware of the practical leading role the Ba'th Party was playing in the Front. This prompted the Iraqi Communist Party to raise obstacles to the Front's progress. It thus deviated from the principles of the Front charter which it signed and approved.

An example of this is what the Communist Party did with regard to the armed forces. It tried to disseminate its organizations inside their ranks when the Ba'ath Party is the commander of these forces and is entitled to disseminate its organizations in their ranks, out of its belief in building the armed forces ideologically. This is stipulated in the charter and was agreed by all the Front parties. Only the Iraqi Communist Party openly violated the charter provisions.

Moreover, the Iraqi Communist Party opposed many of the national stands and policies of the 17-30 July revolution. It is worth mentioning that the said party used to offend some of the states with which Iraq maintained good relations. It used to exploit its internal and propaganda publications for this purpose. It also used to support some sides which were against our national struggle and which adopted stands prejudicial to our Arab causes.

The Iraqi Communist Party felt the Front because it realized that it was completely "bankrupt" and that the 17-30 July Revolution has fulfilled all the people's aims. It was aware that it had lost our masses and could do nothing that would serve the masses in their leading march. In order to cover its miserable failure, the party adopted a hostile stand and went across to the opposing trench. This can simply be described as a stand hostile to the people and their aims. The Communist Party tied its fate to that of the nation's enemies and their conspiracies. However, we believe that the revolution is stronger than all conspiracies and schemes. We also believe that the Front will continue on its path with strong determination, inspired by the noble concepts contained in the National Action Charter. The Front will continue on its road to achieve all the national and pan-Arab aims, unaffected by the Communist Party's departure from the Front. Whoever leaves the Front is discounted by the people forever.

CSO: 4802

ARAB MAJORITY SEEN TRYING TO ORGANIZE POLITICALLY

Tel Aviv AL HANISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Kassim Zay: "The Sane Majority Movement in the Arab Community; The Red Line of Israel's Arabs" (Part Two)]

[Text] Last Friday a group of Arab public figures convened, in order to examine the possibility of establishing a suprapolitical organization, the first of its kind in the Arab community. Those convened agreed unanimously, that the establishment of such an organization was necessary in light of the serious deterioration in both the Jewish and the Arab communities.

According to the initiators of this new organization, the existing political structure in the Arab community does not satisfy the complex problems of this community, especially since most of the parties do not take the voting powers of the Arab citizens seriously. Worse yet, incitement against Arab citizens has become the common fare of most ministers in the government. According to the organizers of the new body, the recent statements of the prime minister and other ministers show the way for the Israeli public.

The Arab leaders maintain that such statements delineate a policy which will be anchored in anti-Arab laws, such as the Terror Law, the Civil Rights Law, and the Bedouin Law.

"You Are Right? What's Next?"

Attorney Muhammad Masarwa, former head of the local council of the village of Kara, is familiar with the mood in the Arab community in particular and in the political map of Israel in general. Creating a new organization, in his opinion, is a positive and necessary step. Masarwa maintains that "the incitement against Arab citizens including Arab students is a grave and unprecedented matter."

"We can take comfort in the fact that the present government is transitory, but its actions today are guidelines and instruction for the Israeli public," he goes on to say. In his opinion, "there are laws today directed against the Arabs, which will be very difficult to revoke once they have passed."

Masarwa relates how in recent years he has met with leaders of the Labor party and has tried to make them aware of the crying injustice Arab citizens were victims of. "Each time I met with Labor leaders I would hear the same reply: You are absolutely right. The question is, what's next? How can one cash in this promissory note of "you are right?"

As a legalist Masarwa mentioned several laws which discriminate against Arab citizens and legitimize acts of incitement against Israeli Arabs: "The Basic Law of Civil Rights was approved without taking into consideration the opinion of the representatives of the Arab community. The Bedouin Law, is designed not only to expropriate the Bedouins' lands, but also to deprive them of their right of appeal. The Tamir Law is directed against Arabs."

"Each Arab Has a Black File"

According to Masarwa, the Tamir Law came in the wake of the last speech of Member of Knesset Tufik Ziad in Nazareth. The intention of that law is not to allow any Arab students to remain in the universities, since as a result of this law every Arab student has to furnish a good conduct certificate for his daily conduct. There is quite simply a tendency to give every Arab a "black file." Masarwa argues that "in most parties there is a consensus to keep Arab representatives in the minority so as to minimize Arab influence in the decision making process. For example: in the Labor party it was decided not to admit more than 5,000-7,000 Arab members to the party. Most parties' attitude toward Arab citizens is one of "suspect him and respect him."

At the same time Masarwa does not see any contradiction between membership of Arab citizens in the new organization and their membership in political parties. Nor does he rule out the membership of any Arab professional body in the suprapolitical organization. Masarwa supports the establishment of such an organization, which will be similar to the American Jewish Congress.

Dealing With Burning Issues

Each member in the organization could belong to any political party, but the new organization will be a mass movement and will operate on a larger scale. "The new organization will have to determine its basic principles and be suprapolitical, but it is not unlikely for members of the organization to meet with representatives of the parties, including the leadership of the Alignment."

"I know that the Alignment will be an alternative to the existing government, but there is no reason for us not to announce unequivocally that we align ourselves with it. The new organization will have to work primarily in the political arena, since the burning problems of the Arab community cannot be delayed. The organizers of the new body will have to deal forthwith with daily problems. Contacts will have to be established with the representatives of the present government without ruling

this government out. We must initiate a dialogue with the present government, and demand of the party which will rule after the elections to take a stand now. We will be able to tell the Alignment: We are ready for the possibility of cooperation between us, but we cannot remain in no man's land."

"To Prevent Taking Control"

Ibrahim Shbat, who discussed the basic principles of the new organization, said that "the new organization will be made up of sane people who believe that Israel is the common homeland of the Jews and the Arabs who live in that land. The new body will be a suprapolitical organization and will have to stand fast not to allow any other body to take control of it."

Shbat, analysing the political map in the Arab community, said that "RAKAH (the communist party) is a demagogic party which engages in slogans which are removed from Israeli reality, since the ears of the Jewish public are closed to RAKAH's statements. RAKAH widens the gap between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel, and narrows the bridge of understanding by mouthing slogans which change regularly by orders from the Kremlin."

"RAKAH, and all the organizations which are spawned by it, deal with a foreign policy which does not interest the Arabs of Israel. About 95 percent of its slogans do not deal directly with the daily life of Israeli Arabs."

According to Shbat, "the main preoccupation of the new organization should be internal Israeli problems which affect the daily life of Israeli Arabs. Ninety five percent of its activities should quite simply be local affairs. The founders of the new organization should be patient, and not act in haste. The establishment of the organization should not be heralded with too much fanfare, and each of its steps should be carefully calculated." Shbat, too, sees the Alignment as the only framework which can be dealt with; "but until now the Alignment has dealt with us on the basis of charity rather than rights."

Shbat believes that sanity should be the guiding light for the founders of the new organization. "We must act sanely. Sanity should be our only quality and only in this way we may last."

Shbat reiterates: "We see the new organization as an independent body which faithfully represents the problems of Israeli Arabs. We also regard the Alignment as the right address for cooperation without becoming dependent on it."

"Walking Through a Mine Field"

Attorney Jamil Shalhoub, former Haifa councilman, is concerned that the intention of forming a suprapolitical organization open to everyone is

like attempting to walk through a mine field. "We have tried all along to serve our constituency through the Alignment. We must make the Alignment aware of the gravity of the situation and to impress upon it that the patriotic duty is to right the wrong. Still, if we are looking to form a new organization--it must be the domain of those loyal to the labor movement, and we have to enter into dialogue with the leadership of the Alignment and make it aware of the grave situation of the Arab citizens. We have to emphasize the need for coexistence. The Alignment must be cognizant of our feelings and should not, in my opinion, put stumbling blocks before us and act like an ostrich. This means that our main task is to bolster the periphery of the Alignment in the Arab community, and the Alignment must know how to appreciate it."

Shalhub did not hide his reservations and misgivings. "We must act in a rational manner and not admit people who will spoil it for us. We must make the Alignment understand that it is the interest of both parties which guide us, and we must also explain another fact: until today the Arabs of Israel have been given rights on paper. The time has come to make those rights a reality."

9565

CSO: 4805

PERES PREPARES PLAN TO REDUCE INFLATION, SPUR ECONOMY

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Jul 80 p 7

[Article by Yosef Pri'el: "Peres Is Doing His Homework; Chairman of Labor Party Formulates Economic Plan Designed To Reduce Inflation and Revitalize Economy"]

[Text] Economic expertise is not, unfortunately, one of the things which have distinguished Israel's prime ministers. Circumstances have forced Israel's leaders to deal mainly with military and political matters, which have over shadowed economic matters and, in turn, have been exacerbated by them.

The chairman of the Labor party, Member of Knesset Shim'on Peres, is seriously preparing for the possibility of heading the next government. He is trying to learn from his predecessors' mistakes, mainly the social and economical ones--which in the final analysis have determined the fate of their governments. Peres is busy these days formulating a broad economic plan, and from a conversation with him it appears that he has familiarized himself with small details, perhaps more than necessary.

The essence of his approach is changing the course of the economy; reducing the inflation and stimulating economic growth. The next government will have to fight inflation mainly through drastic and realistic cuts in the budget. The first thing which must be done according to Peres is stop all allocations related to the settlements. "Between Hebron and flight hours, I prefer flight hours," Peres says. Yet he is aware of the need to significantly reduce the power of the IDF. This can be done through shortening reserve duty and compulsory service, and reducing the size of the regular army. In addition, the armed forces could perform civilian tasks since, according to Peres, reducing the military work force and creating new teams to work on new projects will be more costly and less productive than utilizing the existing military work force. Thus, it is not likely that the new sea canal will be dug by personnel of the IDF Corps of Engineers rather than by civilians employed by the administration which will be set up for this new project.

Peres strongly opposes unemployment. In a country with a high number of workers engaged in defense, there is no reason to consider economic recovery through unemployment. In order to provide work for those presently unemployed and for those who will lose their jobs because of cuts in the defense budget, Peres presents a vast program of investment to the tune of 10 billion dollars, in a relatively short period, which will revitalize the economy. This sum will be obtained through renewed commitments from Jewish investors from abroad for the development of Israel, as well as through a one-time request to the government of the U.S. and West Germany to defer payment of Israeli debts for investment purposes by renewing the loans. The burden will thus fall upon the shoulders of the Israeli taxpayer, especially through lowering the level of consumption of the more affluent classes.

Peres sees three major components in his plan of investment:

- Expanding some 20 established enterprises with a high growth and export potential.

- Establishing an industrial park for science-based industries in the Galilee, which will add 200,000 inhabitants to the area with a higher income level and higher living standards.

- Digging the sea canal with international capital (mainly European). Peres says that in its southern route the canal should be dug only through Israeli territory (within the green line) while looking for regional cooperation in the project (especially with Jordan).

The chairman of the Labor party sees a need to turn the tide by revoking the massive tax exemptions granted by the Likud government. He envisions the possibility of a short term package deal worked out by the government, the Histadrut, and private employers. This deal will include a price and wage control, and profit restraint. To stimulate exports Peres believes it is necessary to subsidize the added value of export, and to reinstate the subsidies for staples at the uniform rate of 30 percent, to enable the resumption of agricultural planning.

The plan which is being developed in consultation with Labor's economic and social exponents, academicians, and Histadrut leaders, also deals with the housing crisis. It offers the possibility of giving land to tenants instead of builders, and building housing projects with subsidized rent.

Peres' conception of the economic team of the government he may be called upon to form calls for a consensus on policy before the formation of the government, thus overcoming the mistakes of previous governments which were severely undermined by interpersonal conflicts and disputes. Peres is not willing to reveal at this time who will be the members of this team. He only promises and hopes that they will be allowed to join the team, only if they agree ahead of time to work as part of the team and will agree on basic principles. It will be interesting to see whether the homework Peres is doing now will not be forgotten, if and when he is called upon to implement it.

GALILI APPOINTMENT TO PLATFORM COMMITTEE ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Member of Knesset Ehud Ulmrat: "The Fig Leaf of the Doves"]

[Text] The appointment of Israel Galili to a central position, for the purpose of formulating Labor's party platform for the forthcoming elections to the Knesset, has caused emotional reactions. Thus, the issue became public instead of remaining an internal party matter. It is not common for rival parties to be concerned with such appointments, but this time the matter could not go unnoticed.

Most of the reactions to the Galili appointment came from frustrated doves in and outside the Alignment. Yosi Sarid promised his supporters in Nazareth he would continue to proudly uphold the banner of the doves. His friends in the circle for alliance have shown consternation over Galili's hawkish stance. National Religious Party member Avraham M'lamed, who is on good terms within his own party with Greater Israel people like Z'vulun Hammer and Ben Tzion Rubin, has taken Galili's appointment as a personal affront, as though it meant breaking a personal commitment to him.

The gist of all these reactions is a fear that the Labor Party is about to forego its patently dovish stands which Shim'on Peres has been espousing lately. It could conceivably return to its traditional stands which have represented the mainstream of the Israeli public for decades, and of which Galili has been one of the most salient and creditable spokesmen.

An Illusion of Change

This fear is unfounded. Peres has no intention of changing his position. He is definitely interested in creating the illusion of change, an outward appearance of toughness, a pretense of hawkishness. In actuality, he does not intend to create a new internal balance in his party, which will weaken the growing power of the extreme doves who provide most of his support within his party.

In recent years when Peres was linked to Dayan inside the Labor Party, he attempted to assist his senior partner in the fight against a consensus

based on the Allon Plan. This fight gave birth to the compromise known as the "Galili Document." This document established a framework for the Alignment policy in the West Bank which attempted to continue the momentum of settlement within the restricted borders of the Allon Plan, the policy open bridges, and the bolstering of the Israeli foothold in those territories while denying the principle of territorial compromise.

The Alignment policy, as enunciated today by Peres, strives conspicuously to give up most of the territory in the West Bank. According to hints dropped lately by Peres, the Alignment under his leadership will be prepared to make these concessions on the basis of an interim agreement. In other words, even without a final and binding peace, with the attending economic and diplomatic relations, Peres today is prepared for a near-total withdrawal, with "insignificant border changes."

A huge gap exists between Peres' present position and his past one. Whatever the reasons for this change, the fact is that his present position reflects the consensus of the doves within his party. No wonder that Yosi Sarid, Abba Eban and others are the main supporters of Peres in the Labor Party. It is also no surprise that MAPAM is not excited about the expected struggle between Peres and Rabin.

A Cosmetic Change

The sharper the public debate leading to the Knesset elections becomes, the clearer it will be to most voters that Peres' labor party is quite different from the party which ruled through a consensus among Golda, Dayan, and Galili. Peres knows that an excessive dovish image projected by the Alignment may hurt him in the elections. He needs an outward cosmetic change. This is why he has turned to Galili. Galili's role is not to shift the center of gravity within the party to new hawkish positions. He is rather expected to help change the image, and create the illusion of change.

We can understand Peres. It is a bit harder to understand Galili. Israel Galili has always appeared to his political opponents both on the left and on the right as a man of stable views, who knows how, public pronouncements notwithstanding, to maintain a position known as balanced hawkishness. This position has striven tenaciously and systematically toward broadening the base of Jewish settlement in the territories, strengthening Israeli expansion in areas vital to its security, and making concessions only when it was vital and absolutely necessary to do so.

Galili has drunk the cup of bitterness because of members of his party who had put excessive blame on him and others for the events of the Yom Kippur War. He did deserve, however, some of the credit for being one of the architects of the policy, rightfully named after him, which contributed toward the expanding of the settlements, the proliferation of outposts in Judea, in the Jordan Valley, in the Golan Heights, and in the Gaza Strip.

In the present political reality, the Labor Party will not repeat, even with Galili, those past performances. Galili knows this better than others. In the best of cases Galili will be the fig leaf which will camouflage, outwardly, Peres' true intentions of returning the territories, including the settlements, most of which had been established by the Labor Party.

The question is not whether Galili deserves to be given a position in the Labor Party, but rather how will he reconcile the contradiction between his stance and the platform he is called upon to formulate. It seems to me that Galili's gift of drafting documents will not suffice to bridge the gap.

9565

CSO: 4805

DETAILS REPORTED ON GAZA MAYOR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPT

Refusal To Host Egyptian Ambassador

TA222036 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 22 Sep 80

[Text] Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa says that he will not meet with the Egyptian Ambassador. He made this statement to a group of Israeli newsmen in Gaza today. Among them was reporter Jerry Cheslow.

[Begin recording] [Cheslow] Political observers in the Gaza Strip say that Rashad al-Shawwa has been disassociating himself steadily from Egypt, and his statement that he would not meet with the Egyptian ambassador can be seen in this context. The mayor hinted that he thought that in his position the meeting would not be advantageous. But when pressed to explain more clearly, al-Shawwa replied:

[al-Shawwa] Well, there are many Arabs. I do not invite them all to my home.

[Cheslow] Al-Shawwa denied that there are growing commercial ties between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. This, in spite of the fact that more than half of the thousands of Gazans that cross into Egypt via al-'Arish weekly are businessmen trying to set up agencies to export Israeli goods or import Egyptian ones. The rift between al-Shawwa and Egypt is further aggravated by the question of universities. Until last year, about 2,000 Gazans were accepted by Egyptian universities annually. But then President al-Sadat closed the door and only 16 Gazans were admitted. Gazans who are close to Egypt say that al-Sadat has given clear signs that what would be required to reopen that door would be a visit to Cairo by a delegation from Gaza headed by Mayor al-Shawwa. This would give a nod to Egyptian policy. But al-Shawwa says the door was closed because of Egypt's large number of students and refuses to consider going.

[al-Shawwa] I personally don't see there is anything that would prevent such a delegation to go. But personally I cannot go. I have got a special status. I can't be in that delegation.

[Cheslow] Meanwhile, the Egyptian influence in the Gaza Strip continues to grow. Besides the preparation by Gazans to become an economic bridge between Egypt and Israel, 67 different Egyptian newspapers are sold in the Gaza Strip every day. And, from the Egyptian side, hundreds of people seeking jobs or higher pay are caught trying to sneak across the border each week and are sent back after 8 hours detention.

Rejects Autonomy Without Palestinian State

TA222142 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2030 GMT 22 Sep 80

[Text] Gaza, 22 Sep--Today Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa expressed his opposition to a sudden and unplanned withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip. Al-Shawwa, who met with newsmen who toured the Gaza Strip, said that Israel plans to pull its forces out of the Gaza Strip without prior announcement and to leave the region in a state of uncertainty as far as internal security is concerned.

According to al-Shawwa, Israel should determine "a timetable" of 2 or 3 years for a complete withdrawal, and then it will be possible to plan Palestinian independence. He again rejected the autonomy plan in Gaza and said that he, like any Palestinian, rejected a piece of an autonomy plan that would not clearly lead to independence and to the establishment of a Palestinian state. According to al-Shawwa, only a just peace with all the Arab states, while recognizing the full rights of the Palestinians, will bring about peace in the region. This will not be achieved by the Camp David accords, which are unacceptable to all of the 4 million Palestinians throughout the world.

In the presence of the commander of the area, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Segev, the mayor complained about the restrictions that limit his movements both to Israel and to Judaea and Samaria and abroad. He also complained about the shortage of policemen, the inability to control the traffic and the unruly situation in the markets due to the shortage of police.

Replying to a question, al-Shawwa voiced harsh criticism of the fact that Israel is developing the economy of the territories for its own purposes and prevents the occupied territories from gaining economic independence.

Mr al-Shawwa argued that he had never presented himself as the representative of Gaza or of the Gaza Strip but as a son of the Palestinian people. He expressed his views which, according to him, are shared by the majority of his people. He also rejected the accusation that he opposed holding elections for the municipality.

The commander of the region, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Segev, who was asked questions later on, denied the charges concerning the alleged restrictions on al-Shawwa's movements. He said that al-Shawwa had been abroad only 2 months ago, that 6 months ago he had visited Arab states and that his movements into Israel are completely unlimited.

BRIEFS

ARREST OF W. BANK MAYOR--The Qalqilyah Municipality has denied the accusations of the military government that the pamphlet published by the municipality about its achievements--which cause the detention of the Qalqilyah mayor--contains any elements of instigation. The Qalqilyah Municipality met in emergency session this afternoon and decided to send protest cables to the defense minister and to the Judea and Samaria commander with the demand to release the mayor. Notables in Judea and Samaria told our correspondent Arye Gus that the arrest of the Qalqilyah mayor is another step in the military government scheme to depose the mayors that have been elected by the population. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reported details from the pamphlet that led to the arrest of the mayor. In the preface to the pamphlet the Qalqilyah mayor wrote that he hoped the residents would continue to live on the fatherland's soil in spite of the difficult conditions of the occupation. He scores the former municipal council for having attached Qalqilyah to Israel's electricity grid. The pamphlet cover depicts the municipality emblem in the colors of the Falastin flag. About 1,000 copies of this pamphlet were printed, half of which were sent to Libya, which has adopted the Qalqilyah Municipality. [Text] [TA231900 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 23 Sep 80]

IDF ARMS TO TERRORISTS, CRIMINALS--IDF arms and sabotage materials have been used in dozens of terrorist acts perpetrated by terrorists and underworld figures. The police command has recently warned against this in meetings with senior IDF officers and the matter has been brought to the attention of Chief of Staff Rafa'el Eytan. Many terrorist squads have used explosives stolen from IDF camps. Also the explosions in Jaffa, whose purpose involved settling accounts, used IDF explosives. The hand-grenades thrown in Dimona were stolen from an IDF camp, and a few days ago the police captured a Ramla resident who tried to sell 10 IDF-made handgrenades to a Gaza Arab. According to information from the police, more than one weapon is stolen from the IDF daily. The police believe that criminal elements and especially drug addicts who were recruited into the IDF as part of mobilization and the uneducated, underprivileged youths steal arms and explosives in order to buy drugs. The police claim

that the IDF does not do enough in the way of orderly supervision and registration of soldiers receiving arms. The criminal identification department has occasional difficulty identifying the source of the IDF arms found in the possession of terrorists and criminals. The police view the IDF--so I was told by a senior officer--as a major source of arms for hostile elements and the underworld. [Excerpt] [TA191518
Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

CSO: 4805

SIGNIFICANCE OF PHALANGE OFFENSIVE AGAINST NLP DISCUSSED

Review of Past Developments

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14-20 Jul 80 pp 6, 7

[Article by Yusuf Ibrahim al-Ammar: "The War of the Two Parties"]

[Text] What happened last week between the Phalange and Liberal Parties in the eastern area of Beirut and the areas of Matn, Kasrawan and Jubayl was a major turning point in the history of relations between the two parties and the whole situation in Lebanon. The consequences and dimensions of the bloody clashes witnessed by the eastern areas exceeded all reasonable expectations of the allies and supporters of the two parties. What happened was not merely "isolated incidents" or actions by "undisciplined" elements which happened and were dealt with by rapid contacts.

Although Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil still proclaim their "unbounded" solidarity, the reality imposed by the "war of the two parties" has demonstrated indisputably that in the eastern areas, the Liberal Party has become a mere political party with no military strength.

However, the question raised by observers has been: Was the objective of what happened to contain the Liberals militarily preparatory to a political containment, or was it to consolidate party forces under the banner of "the Lebanese forces," as Phalangist forces have been eager to say since the bloody clashes began?

In trying to answer this question, one has to go back and spotlight earlier developments.

Two weeks ago, at a popular meeting with economic and social notables in Kasrawan, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil was engaged in a dialogue marked by a high degree of candor. During this dialogue, there was raised the excesses about which the citizens were complaining in the eastern area as well as the imposition of the "payoffs" on them by every organization, something which was a real burden to them. Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil responded to these observations, acknowledging that there were excesses and affirming indirectly that the party machinery had failed to exercise control in these matters. He moved on to a discussion of the role of "the Lebanese forces" at the present stage and raised the issue of the

lack of their consolidation under an effective leadership. He focussed on the necessity of effective unification of all forces of the parties of the "Lebanese Front," bringing up the many attempts that had been made in this regard, and finally saying, "If these forces are not unified in an amicable manner, some madman will have to unify them by force, despite all the difficulties." He raised a slogan since he said that there could be no military unity of the parties under the shadow of political pluralism, using as a premise the necessity of preserving the democracy advocated by the Phalange Party "because there could be no Lebanon without democracy and no democracy without unarmed political and party pluralism and no civilian political pluralism without unified forces removed from politics."

Only a few days after the statement of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, the incidents broke out in al-Ashrafiyah between the Phalange and the Liberals, the comrades of the one rank and the two members of the "Lebanese Forces." However, these incidents were able to be confined within a narrow framework and the two parties avoided facing "the stern test."

The First Downpour

A few days later there were clashes in Wadi Shahrur in Ba'abda District between the Phalange and the Liberals. The effect was isolated at first but then they spread and became general, beginning to move from one area to another and involving Basus, Kafr Shima, Batahiyah, al-Mardashah, Basaba, etc. These villages were reckoned as falling within the Liberal Party's area of influence and military officials there figured the Phalange's chances for loss there were great and that allied forces had doublecrossed them. One of the negative consequences of these battles was that there were a number of casualties, mostly Phalangists. These villages surrounded the areas of Badadun and Humal in 'Alayh District which for some months had witnessed clashes between the Phalange and Liberal Party ending with the army's entry into the two areas.

To prevent the situation from worsening in Wadi Shahrur and the neighboring area, the army came in with the approval of the two parties involved. The Liberal Party viewed what had happened as a victory for it within the context of the victories it had won when the army entered 'Ayn al-Rumanah and Farn al-Shubbak and, before that, al-Hadath following bloody clashes between the two parties. At the same time, Phalangist sources, particularly those close to Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil felt that the Wadi Shahrur incidents had been contrived and accused the army of collusion with the Liberals and with facilitating the movement of supplies to them which had made the battle unequal. The Liberals blew up Phalangist headquarters in Wadi Shahrur and Batahiyah and killed a number of Phalangists.

People in Beirut following the events noticed that Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil had refused to comment on what happened in Wadi Shahrur and declined to attend the meetings convened to deal with the deteriorating situation there. Statements coming from him to confidants carried a great deal of censure for the Liberals.

Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil recognized the gravity and ramifications of this interval, seeing a dark cloud on the horizon of the relations of the two parties, and hastened to get in touch with President Sham'un to contain possible events, particularly since the reports that the head of the Phalange had seen indicated that something was in the wind. The leading elements of "the Lebanese Front" held a meeting in Bikfaya marked by complete candor about the present situation. Al-Jumayyil proposed to Sham'un that the two parties should unite under Sham'un's leadership to cut the ground from under any dispute between the comrades of "the single trench." This proposal was announced to the reporters and Sham'un accepted it with thanks, praise and appreciation, announcing that it would be necessary for the proposal to be studied by the leading elements of the two parties.

The two allies decided to meet the following day to discuss this issue and to revive the activity of the joint committee that had been formed in the wake of the al-Ashrafiyah incidents two weeks earlier to take "steps in depth" to put a stop to the problems.

What Is Written Is Written

However, the course of events altered that day and neither of the two leaders knew that their efforts would be frittered away by unlimited clashes.

Just as each incident begins in an isolated manner, "the war of the two parties" began in Tabarja when a Phalangist official was seriously wounded by gunfire. This incident was the spark that ignited the whole eastern area.

There were fierce battles along the Kasrawan coast, particularly in the strongholds of the Liberals in al-Safra, Kafr Yasin, Tabarja and Adma. Along with this, the Liberals' headquarters were occupied, Deny Sham'un's home was burned and his sister was wounded. There was fierce fighting which left 50 dead in al-Safra alone. The homes of Liberals were blown up and others occupied throughout Kasrawan, and the Liberals were left with no more military presence in the area. Their major stronghold, the Ghasta barracks, also fell.

There were bloody clashes in al-Ashrafiyah lasting 2 days, followed by the occupation of 5 centers of the Liberals and a major barracks in al-Sayufi, attacks on the home of President Sham'un and firing on the Phalangist barracks. During a 48 hour period, the Liberals' positions fell, either through military force or voluntarily after President Sham'un ordered his fighters to withdraw from al-Ashrafiyah and to hand over the centers to the Phalange. So another stronghold of the Liberals in a sensitive area fell.

There was fierce fighting in the Jubayl area ending with the fall of the Liberals' 'Amshit barracks and the surrender of all other centers in Jurud al-'Aqurah and al-Laqluq.

There were sporadic clashes in the northern Matn which ended with an agreement between the officials in the Liberals and Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil to spare the area of any conflict and the Liberals handed over their positions, barracks and the port in Dhabiyah to the Phalange voluntarily. There was only one incident in Barmana arising from an old score to settle between the two parties there.

Fuqra, where Dani Sham'un, secretary of defense in the Liberals, set up positions after his home was burned, fell and part of it was destroyed and he had to move to al-Hazimiyah after announcing his resignation from the party and attacking Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, describing what the Phalange had done as a "doublecrossing crime." Al-Jumayyil's son accused Sham'un's son of exploiting his father's position (President Sham'un) to become a leader of the Christians as his successor.

Security Operations In Earnest

While the Liberal Party accused the Phalange of resorting to genocide because of both its political and military presence, circles of "the Phalangist Military Council" say that what ignited the eastern area was "security operations which were undertaken by an extremely earnest decision to consolidate ranks, end the incidental clashes and put a stop to the internal strikes to which the Lebanese Front had been subjected." These sources went further, describing what had happened as "an operation to sort out the ground between the allies and allied subordinate elements." These sources drew a link between what had happened and the necessity of closing "the drug ports and the gambling and hashish clubs, of dissolving the joint financing and consolidating the military presence on the ground to make the slogans of unification a living reality."

These sources stressed that what had happened "was an attempt to disarm politicians and remove politics from the hands of the military out of concern for a unified position and a unified decisionmaking process on the one hand, and a unified fighting front for Lebanon."

However, Dany Sham'un held to another position since he viewed what the Phalangists had done as a plan to implement the policy of a single party, linking what had happened in al-Safra to "a second Ihdin operation" targeting him personally because he had been at home at the time of the attack against it, he would have been killed. He reiterated his rejection of any cooperation with the Phalange, announcing that he would refuse to meet with "the criminals" at the same table. He and his brother Dory chose to meet in al-Hazimiyah where the army has a strong presence with the area located under the control of the legitimate authorities.

It has also been reported that President Sham'un decided to leave his home in al-Ashrafiyah after ordering his supporters to withdraw from their positions and that he will move to the area of 'Ayn al-Rumanah, al-Hadath or al-Hazimiyah or, in the worst case, to Dayr al-Qamr where he began building a mansion some time ago.

It is clear that "the war of the two parties" resulted in a true estrangement, particularly on the grassroots level, since President Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil took pains to hold meetings and to appear together in Tyre and also in making statements.

The Sole One and the Strongest

Observers have proceeded to analyze the ramifications of what happened last week and summed them up in some specific elements involving the following points:

1. The Phalange Party has become the sole and strongest party in the eastern area of Beirut, regardless of whether what happened was under the slogan of facilitating unification or of "containment."
2. The party has proven that it is capable of taking decisive action, whatever the consequences.
3. The fate of "the Lebanese Front" is in jeopardy because the withdrawal of the Liberals from it, after former President Sulayman Franjiyah pulled out, reaffirms that the Phalange Party will tolerate no political or military partnership with any other party.
4. A contradiction has emerged in the positions of the Phalange because the attitude represented by Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil does not agree with what happened, having opposed the occurrence of any incidents in the Matn area.
5. The Phalange will be more and more inclined toward political isolation and "the areas mentality" since the Islamic faction and "the nationalist faction" will take a harder line toward any possibility of cooperating with the Phalange.
6. Any attempt to form a national union government bringing together all Lebanese factions has been aborted given the increased number of parties who refuse to participate in the same government with the Phalange. This is what was implied by Dany Sham'un when he said that he had reservations about participating in any government which included Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil.
7. Apprehensions have mounted that the Phalange will venture to proclaim some specific step in the areas which they dominate now that it has begun to make political and military movements freely and unopposed, something that could whet the appetites of other quarters, particularly in the north, for adopting similar positions.

8. Any role which the army could play in the eastern area of Beirut at the present stage has been eliminated since the Phalange Party does not agree to such a role despite statements made here and there in this regard.

In the opinion of observers, the specific elements brought forth by the "Phalange-Liberals war" have turned the political situation in the country upside down because they involve profound and manifold significant indications involving the relationship of the two parties with each other and then with other parties.

These people say that the deeprooted disagreement over policy between the two parties were behind what happened and that covering them by calling them isolated incidents was nothing more than an attempt to erase the real causes. Among these disagreements was the Liberals' unhappiness over the unilateral open door attitude of the Phalange toward Syria and the renewed courting between Damascus and the Phalange, with the Liberals left out of it, keeping in mind that President Sham'un had indirectly criticized the renewal of this dialogue and had advocated that any contact with Damascus should be through the Lebanese Government. Moreover, the contacts which Sham'un had made during recent days with the resistance on the one hand, and the Soviet ambassador on the other had not left much satisfaction with the Phalange who, while having talked with the Soviets, were eager to attack the Palestinians violently. Also, the Phalange accused the Liberals of establishing security and political coordination with President Sulayman Franjiyah in the north.

While the Liberals are charging the Phalange with liquidating it politically and militarily, Phalangist sources say that what happened was nothing more than an attempt to straighten out the abnormal situation that prevailed in the area, a serious attempt to restructure the party political presence on a pluralistic basis and the party military presence on a unification basis. In this context, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil said that the weapons that the Phalangists seized from the barracks of the Liberals would not be used against party members but for the sake of the pan-Arab and national objectives for which the Lebanese forces were working, "the most important of which was the continuation of the battle of liberation."

However, a question remains: Does what happened in the eastern areas go beyond the framework of military change to that of geographic change with the objective of partition, or does it fall within the framework of "the battle for influence?"

It is premature to answer the first part of the question though it might be in the negative as long as all parties reaffirm the importance of the unity of Lebanon and their struggle to keep it as one entity within political, social and democratic pluralism.

Analysis of Anticipated Events

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21-27 Jul 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Yusuf Ibrahim al-Asmar: "Unification of Lebanon or Division of the Maronites?"]

[Text] To the same extent that the agreement of the Phalange and National Liberals Party and their cohesiveness constituted one of the most important

components of the Lebanese war in the past, their bloody break constitutes a dangerous leap into the unknown and a dramatic step toward "the greater events yet to come" in Lebanon and, perhaps, in the area.

What is yet to come is a common subject of speculation, as newspaper headlines attest, some well known local ones refer to the partitioning of Lebanon, the emptying of the south and its economy, division of the maronites, prevention of entente, and the end of the rule of the "Emirs." Some which are not local refer to solution of the Palestine issue, putting all parties to this solution on the line, resettling the Palestinians, the Palestinian state, autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza, etc.

It is difficult for observers to define the goal of the Phalange in liquidating the military power of the Liberal Party which, as of 7 July, became "the ally of yesterday" in search of allies among "the enemies of yesterday." In the meantime, the Phalange has not managed to contain the situation of hostility between it and another "ally of yesterday," former President Sulayman Frankiyah, after the Ihdin massacre on 13 June 1978.

Some see what happened as a new phase in favor of "the conspiracy," one objective of which is to strike a blow at the Maronites or, at least, to split and weaken them, making it easy to resettle the Palestinians and, consequently, resolve the Palestinian issue.

There are also those who optimistically believe that what happened may prompt the largest illegal military force (that is, the Phalange) to use the dominant position it has won in favor of the legitimate establishment in return for the exclusive rights and privileges it can exchange it for.

The specific factors are still amorphous. What is certain but not in definite form is that what happened between the Phalange and the Liberals moved a piece on the chessboard of the solution in the area. As for Lebanon, there is nothing wrong with hoping for the best but everyone is asking: Will the decision be Lebanese?

Where is Lebanon Headed?

This is the question that is raised in political circles and official quarters after the Lebanese war entered the heart of two allied parties, almost becoming a Maronite-Maronite war after having been a Maronite-Palestinian war.

What is meant by a Maronite-Maronite war and what are its objectives?

Some of them say that the conspiracy against Lebanon which had schemed to displace the Maronites, ships even having been sent to take them from Lebanon and distribute them among the American countries to facilitate solution of the Palestinian issue on the basis of resettlement, failed because of the efforts of the Maronite fighting man so the aspect of the conspiracy transformed into a war from within against the defiant

Maronites with the objective of containing them, taming them and forcing them to accept the resettlement they now reject; otherwise, partition.

Others say that the Maronite-Maronite war may be the beginning of the implementation of a plot to create sectarian mini-states in the area as the best means to safeguard the security of Israel and, consequently, the security of the oil, the conspiracy which Dr Kissinger planned. The preoccupation of the United States with the presidential elections could be a propitious opportunity to implement it. It might also be the way to freeze conditions and prevent any solution, even a partial one, for the Lebanese crisis, even only its internal aspect.

When the Lebanese Government proceeded with the entente process in the hope of forming a government of effective elements who would deploy the army in all areas and restore the sovereignty of legitimate authority to them, it by this movement overstepped the red lines because it or any other party was forbidden to accomplish any solution ending the crisis before the picture of the comprehensive solution of the Middle East crisis had emerged.

Achieving entente among the Lebanese and formation of a government of effective elements would mean that the Lebanese crisis had ended or had been disengaged from the crisis of the area. This was unacceptable because it would nullify the schemes laid down to resolve the Middle East crisis as an outgrowth of the Lebanese crisis that was intensifying it.

Solution of the Lebanese crisis in isolation of a solution to the area crisis, by entente and formation of a government of effective elements, would require withdrawal of the Arab Deterrent Force from Lebanon and, consequently, withdrawal of the international forces from the south so that the Lebanese army could be deployed in all areas to establish the sovereignty of the state over all territory and there would no longer be any armed presence, Lebanese or Palestinian, except that of the legitimate government.

Is this possible now, before arrangements are made for the comprehensive solution of the Middle East crisis, keeping in mind that senior officials in friendly and sister states have repeatedly stressed that the crisis of Lebanon is linked with the Middle East crisis and that the only solution of the Lebanese issue will come with solution of the Palestinian issue?

So, how can there be a Lebanese decision to resolve the Lebanese crisis while Arab and international resolutions on the highest levels have been unable to resolve it, or do not want to solve it?

Any premature solution will fail through political action or a military blow as shown by the fact that when the nine European countries tried to present a solution for the Middle East crisis and to present an initiative in this regard, the United States hastened to direct a strongly worded warning to them and they stopped the presentation of any solution and

merely announced principles. Even the Chancellor of Austria, Bruno Kreisky, halted any move for solution of the Middle East crisis until the American presidential elections are over on the argument that the important thing now is not to look for a solution but to use every possible means of pressure to prevent Israel from detonating the situation in the area in a way that would sabotage the principles that would be suitable for a just and comprehensive solution.

Therefore, while the recent security incidents have some positive elements such as establishing security in the eastern area and preventing excesses and crimes, the negative elements, or to put it better, the objectives that they intentionally or unintentionally achieved, involve freezing any solution to the crisis and strengthening the status quo, leaving no room for discussion to achieve entente among the Lebanese or to form a government of effective elements. This means that every party to the dispute on the Lebanese scene is still in place and there will be no room to discuss the withdrawal of the Arab Deterrent Force or the disappearance of the Palestinian armed presence. The portrayal of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil after the recent bloody events as the "bogeyman" for the western area and as having formed a force of 40,000 fighting men to liberate this area makes the leaderships there refrain from demanding the entry of the army because, given its present state, it could not provide protection for them and what can provide this protection is the continued Syrian military presence, in addition to the Palestinian armed presence.

A complex of fear now rules the western area. The leading elements there say: If this is what happened where things are good in the eastern area, what havoc would be wrought in the bad western area?

Does the situation now face a stage of stagnation until the American presidential elections and will any solution to the crisis of Lebanon be through a solution to the Middle East crisis with the way things are?

Will the solution be at the expense of Lebanon, bringing resettlement and partition or fragmentation or will the solution keep in mind the unity of the land, people and institutions of Lebanon, if one is to believe the statements of senior officials in friendly and sister countries?

Informed sources say that it will be difficult to restore Lebanon to what it was politically and geographically, particularly if resettlement takes place. All signs indicate that resettlement is happening, and that the sentence is being passed to be carried out at the appropriate time.

King Hussein, through his extensive activity, has been able to avert a solution at the expense of his country. He has agreed to enter negotiations with Israel after Begin's government departs and the Labor Party government comes in and, this would also be after anticipated developments and changes in the area permit the convening of an Arab summit that would authorize King Hussein to hold negotiations to regain

the West Bank for establishment of a Palestinian regime linked with Jordan within the framework of a confederation.

This authorization would abrogate the resolution of the Rabat summit that treated the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and gave it alone the right to negotiate the restoration of the West Bank and to establish a Palestinian state on all or part of the Palestinian territory.

The proposal now is that the PLO should take part in the peace negotiations, as set forth in the statement issued by the nine European countries in Venice.

In order to accomplish this, the same sources expect Israel to venture upon a military strike against the Palestinian resistance with the objective of containing and weakening it so that the proposed solution will then be on a par with its cause because this solution does not now measure up to the size of the resistance.

This military strike will deal with the steadfastness of Syria in the face of solutions that are not fair to the Arabs and do not give the Palestinians their full rights, the objective being to strike a blow at this steadfastness and to force Syria to accept a possible solution to the area crisis.

They also expect this military strike to be followed by the fall of the Rabin government. At that time, the peace negotiations will enter a new phase with moderate negotiators since the hardline negotiators will have disappeared or will have been contained and tamed. Execution of the settlement sentence will begin without constituting a death sentence for Lebanon; rather, the sentence will be commuted to hard labor, if not for life, for many years.

What can grow out of resettlement once the forces opposing it have been struck or contained? The political fiefdoms which used to rule Lebanon could be transformed into administrative units in which a sort of autonomy is established within the framework of a confederation of federation.

These units are being defined in the light of what will have happened to the map of political leaderships in the country. Confirming it is what President Sarkis himself made public when talking about effecting political powers in the country, that is, augmented administrative decentralization without going into detail in defining this decentralization.

Prime Minister Salim al-Huss went into greater detail in explaining the decentralization he was proposing as part of an integrated reform plan he had prepared. In accordance with it, Lebanon would be divided into regions corresponding to the boundaries of the present provinces and departments corresponding to the present districts.

Each district, or department, would have an administrative council composed of a specific number of members elected by the mayors from among their own number and augmented by the deputies from the area, except for the capital, Beirut, whose administrative council would comprise members of the municipality, augmented by the deputies from the city. Each district would have the right to set up a reserve development and reconstruction budget besides its ordinary budget.

A special feature of this decentralization is that it keeps close at hand the sources of public services and the handling of citizens' affairs and the development of local development projects and preserves the unity of the homeland and state, establishing a sort of close tie between local administration and the central administration through the governor because the proposed decentralization maintains the unity of the army, the internal security forces, educational programs, the general budget, development planning, legislation, information and foreign representation.

Will Lebanon move toward a system of canton or a federal system if resettlement is brought to it within the framework of a decentralization accomplished by agreement on delineating its borders and thereby achieving the security of Lebanon just as, through resettlement, the security of Israel and, consequently, the security of oil is achieved?

Emile Khuri

What Comes After the "7 July Movement?"

It will not be easy in the short term, at least, for relations between the Phalange and Liberal Parties to return to what they were before 7 July, the date "war" broke out between the two parties leaving, according to available information, about 150 dead.

This impression which has been formed by observers in Beirut is the talk of about all local and Arab political circles represented in Lebanon and the talk of Western and diplomatic circles. It appeared as well in the reception given by the French embassy on 14 July and also at the reception given by the Iraqi embassy on the anniversary of 17 July and so it was about time for the average Lebanese to encounter the same impression.

The war between the two parties went past all reasonable bounds and, given its results, turned into a set of factors preventing the restoration of any alliance between the two parties, at least on the rank and file level and certainly on the level of the military forces.

Day after day, information disclosed what had taken place during the 3-day war, aggravating the estrangement and cutting the ground from under any attempt to heal the cut. This estrangement is intensified by the disparate points of view of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, chairman of the Phalangist Military Council and commander of the "Lebanese Forces," and

Dany Sham'un, secretary of defense in the National Liberal Party and commander of the "Tigers of the Liberals" who suffered a major defeat during the recent incidents. The dispute between the two men, which had reached a final breaking point, has begun to threaten the future of relations between the two parties first of all, and then relations between their leaders, President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, who despite what had happened had continued to maintain contact, meetings between them to find a new formula for working together having been revealed. On more than one occasion they stressed their "eagerness" to continue cooperation between the two parties although this "eagerness" had not been translated into any actual agreement to put a stop to reports of an imminent break.

Persons who met with President Sham'un the week after the incidents felt that he was deeply bitter over the results of the clashes and, in talking with his visitors, went so far as to raise question marks about the goal sought by the Phalange Party in what happened in the eastern area. He revealed to confidants that he would prefer to dissolve the Liberals' military forces rather than merge them with those of the Phalange were the two parties unable to reach agreement to restore matters to the status quo prior to Monday, 7 July, that is, restoration of the centers, barracks and light and heavy weapons now in the hands of the Phalangists.

Was Dany Sham'un Quick or Overhasty?

President Sham'un also disclosed to visitors that the Liberal Party had lost the battle militarily and some of its key leaders had been killed but it had made political gains from it and so was now stronger morally and politically but weaker militarily.

He also told his visitors that he would make no "dramatic" decision under the pressure of emotion but would continue to study the issue from all angles in the hopes of reaching a solution. He, however, expressed fears that it would not be possible to erase what he termed "the effects of the massacre" at any early date which means that for the immediate future, the situation will remain neither pending nor settled between the Phalange and the Liberals.

While the position of the elder Sham'un is to maintain an acceptable moderation toward the Phalange, the stances of his son, Dany Sham'un, have imposed a new reality which cannot be ignored since he is drawing pictures of new alliances on the horizon of Lebanese political relations which could turn the situation upside down politically and militarily.

Sham'un, who abandoned his caution and spoke harsh words about the Phalange and its leader, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, and his son, Bashir al-Jumayyil, has been quick to take positions offensive to the allies of yesterday. It would appear that he took these positions on purpose to achieve political victories to make up for the military loss he and his forces had suffered.

In addition to accusing the Phalange of a powergrab and describing its leaders as "criminals," Dany Sham'un moved quickly, some say too quickly, to try to attract a large measure of support from the "enemies of yesterday," or at least those who had not been in agreement with the "Lebanese Front." He began his contacts with Walid Junblat and reached agreement with him on an early meeting. He met in secret with Yasir 'Arafat, head of the PLO Executive Committee. He went north and met with Sulayman Franjiyah and talked comfortably about "the Phalangist fascist terrorism," "the domination of one party" and "the perpetrators of the Ihdin and al-Safra massacres."

Although he only spent a short time in the north, Dany was able to sketch out for the former president the preliminary bases for the establishment of "a national Christian front" that would move to oppose "the Phalangist plan aimed at partitioning Lebanon." He proposed as candidates for this front President Franjiyah, President Sham'un, Doyen Raymond Iddih and "all Christians who had been harmed" or "who had been dispossessed from the eastern areas. Reportedly the effective agreement which was reached with Franjiyah was to coordinate things in depth politically and militarily and to consolidate action to achieve the overall objective which Sham'un wanted as a working basis, that is, to oppose the Phalange Party.

Dany set forth the broad lines of these bases to Prime Minister al-Huss when he visited him one night. He was accompanied to al-Dawhah by a force from the Syrian special units which provided him protection starting from the Sim'an Gallery to al-Dawhah, passing through Sabra, al-Awza'i, Khalde, al-Shayyah, etc.

The Gallows or the Electric Chair

Dany did not confine his contacts within this framework but also contacted ex-Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam and officials in the Murabitun, as well as a number of resistance leaders. An observer could sense from the statements Sham'un reiterated in the meetings the degree of antipathy he had come to feel toward any dialogue with the Phalange, particularly with Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, who he said intended to establish the state of "(shakhbut)" and whom he described as "a war criminal who deserved the gallows or the electric chair." In his criticism, he did not spare Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil who he said was "a liar and rejected the stationing of the army because he was a (fi'wi)." However, in the positions which Dany adopted, he did not propose any specific formula as a basis for action to counter "the schemes of the Phalange" which means that this formula is still vague or needs clarification. The point he made in everything he did was to criticize the Phalange and reaffirm his willingness to oppose it politically and militarily, emphasizing the importance of forming a Christian front to resist "the fascist type Phalangist outreach."

Observers have taken a long look at the contradictory positions of the elder Sham'un and his son. The former is still stressing his continued relationship with the Phalange while the latter is predicting the early "end of the Phalange and the liberation of the eastern areas." They are wondering whether roles have been assigned or whether President Sham'un is not really convinced that the Phalange can be politically and militarily shaken at the present time.

On a par with the positions of Sham'un and his son are discordant stands held respectively by Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and his two sons, Amin and Bashir. The former is apparently taking pains to keep relations between him and President Sham'un on clear and firm bases and he is prepared to concede anything the head of the Liberals wants. Amin is pursuing a similar course as reflected during the meetings which he has held with Sham'un and his son, Dany, despite the strong language and accusations which Dany has used, and, on more than one occasion, he has been careful to stress the failure of the policy of violence, warning against continuing the tragedy to the point of no return.

Bashir Talks About Dany

Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil has taken a position different from that of his father and brother although he is in agreement with them on the necessity of preserving the role of President Sham'un and his political weight. Shaykh Bashir, who is considered to be responsible for the Monday, 8 July operation, has been careful to say that what happened that day was to control the way things were getting out of hand in the eastern areas, a situation that, in his view, would lose more of the positions which had been held by the "Lebanese forces," such as Wadi Shahrur, 'Ayn al-Rumanah and Farn al-Shubbak, which the army had entered following the party clashes. He stressed that the purpose of "the 7 July operation" was to reconsolidate the military strength of the "Lebanese forces" in a new framework and to halt the illegal smuggling and port closures which the Liberals had been accused of being behind. Bashir al-Jumayyil recognizes the gravity and ramifications of the operation and says that the Phalange faces two choices: Either the Monday operation is the end of the Lebanese cause and the beginning of the catastrophe that could ensue, or it is the beginning of deliverance and a genuine unification and reorganization of existing forces, the Lebanese Front" and the Lebanese Forces."

Bashir al-Jumayyil placed great stress on denying any Phalangist desire to impose one-party control in the Christian areas or to succeed in imposing autonomous security, emphasizing at the same time that the army will enter the eastern areas only if it also enters the Islamic areas, the south, the Biqa' and the north. He felt that what happened on Monday, 7 July, "was nothing more than a restructuring of the armed presence in the eastern zone until the state can enter the other areas to discharge its responsibilities."

Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil does not conceal his annoyance at the stands of Dany Sham'un, saying that he acted too hastily in taking steps that will hurt him as a person and as a party. He also says that he tried repeatedly to persuade Dany that he must give up protecting certain elements who are trying to injure both parties but he refused and, in fact, covered up their activities. He feels that the clashes between the Phalange and the Liberals stem from the presence of a number of "strangers" whom the Liberal Party had "embraced" after the 2-year war, including the pan-Arabs, the Syrians, the Palestinians, the communists and the leftists. He says that they are behind every problem. Besides this, Bashir says that Dany had not coordinated things with "the Lebanese Forces" and had refused to take part in their meetings and activities which left the Liberals' participation in the field only token participation, things having been left to the Phalange.

However, Dany replies to this accusation by saying that "the Lebanese Forces" were never allied forces "since the Phalangist Military Council controlled them and used them to serve its own interests.

The fact is that there is an endless file of accusations back and forth and each side has its comments on the other which may or may not be true but they exist and the two sides have been constantly exchanging them during the past 2 weeks and the newspaper columns have been filled with "the dirty linen" of the allies of yesterday.

Terms of the Elder Sham'un

While the military situation has quieted on the Phalange-Liberals front since the former has been able to impose its authority in the field, the issue is still interacting politically in the midst of developments which indicate that there will be no speedy reunification of the two parties.

The leaderships of each party have been unable to emerge with a common solution to ensure renewed agreement and understanding. All the formulas proposed in this regard have failed because of the two conditions laid down by President Sham'un in connection with restoration of weapons and the centers still have received no clear Phalangist response, according to Liberal sources. The Phalange does not object to returning the centers but will not agree to hand over the "confiscated" weapons, the issue being in the hands of "the Lebanese Forces." There are successive party meetings with no result except the issuance of statements of the "hear and be cheery" type.

Bashir al-Jumayyil's Mini-State and Isolation

The Phalange-Liberals dispute goes further to involve other parties, particularly the Muslim side and "the Nationalist Movement." Both sides were startled at what happened in the eastern area and went on guard for fear that Bashir al-Jumayyil wanted to establish autonomous security

as a forerunner to partition of the country. Outcries followed one another from every side demanding that the incidents be stopped and that Bashir al-Jumayyil's mini-state be prevented. Participating in the anti-Phalange campaigns were Prime Minister Salim al-Huss who forcefully attacked the Phalange, as well as "the Islamic Grouping," "The Front to Preserve the South," "The Nationalist Movement" and the Palestinian resistance. The latter was not cautious but rather plunged into the fray and 'Arafat accused Bashir al-Jumayyil of coordinating things with Begin. Even Damascus, through the information media there, attacked the Phalange, accusing it of "wanting unilateral control over the Christian areas and the imposition of partition in Lebanon."

These campaigns kept pace with the positions taken by Dany Sham'un and his open-door posture toward the Islamic areas and their leaders to form a link in the chain of movements designed to "isolate" the Phalange once again, the late Kamal Junblatt having tried to isolate it the first time in 1976 after the 'Ayn al-Rumanah incident, the spark that ignited the 2-year war.

Many individuals tried to hasten to apply the principle of isolation but there were others who held off from proceeding with this scheme because any negative attempt along this line would bring the Phalange the full support and sympathy of the Christians, as had happened 5 years ago, causing the plan to fail and the Christians to rally further around the Phalange. A number of leaders sensed that an advocated using another approach for action the outlines of which have not yet crystallized. Even the Phalange Party itself blocked any new attempt at isolation, laying down a two-pronged plan of movement covering both the local and Arab spheres to explain what happened in the eastern areas, one essential element being to contact Damascus to find out what it really thought about the incidents and their consequences.

At the same time the party wants to firm up its relations with the Armenians to reassure them and to set up coordination between the Phalange and their parties to avoid any clash or involvement, particularly since there have been many rumors that the Armenians might share the fate of the Liberals if they do not surrender their arms. The plan also provides for gradually removing the Phalangist presence" from the streets and making "the Lebanese Forces" carry the responsibility for controlling the security situation and the illegal closure of the ports--this was done last week--and for trying those persons accused of the excesses which were brought out by the killing, theft and looting.

Phalangist sources feel that such steps will calm the nerves of the citizens and persuade them that the objective of "the Monday, 7 July operation" was not to "eliminate" the Liberal Party as a rival party as much as it was to put a stop to the excesses and to the persons demanding payoffs who were [word not understood] under the aegis of the Liberals.

What Alliances, What Agreement?

However the questions that remain are what shape will the new alliances take if the Phalange and Liberal Parties do not reach agreement, and if this agreement is reached, will it remain a partial one as long as Dany Sham'un refuses to sit down at the same table with Bashir al-Jumayyil?

It is hard to answer this question because what happened in the eastern area reshuffled the deck but the cards have not been redealt in a proper and clear fashion. It is premature to say that some alliance can be established between Dany Sham'un and "the Nationalist Movement," for example, or with the resistance to isolate or oppose the Phalange because of their disparate points on a number of issues. Moreover, Walid Junblatt is still moving slowly on reviving relations with Dany or even opening any speedy or effective dialogue. He has been so cautious that he has not invited Dany to visit al-Mukhtarrah or the Shuf, for example, although Dany announced that he was prepared to go to this area and to Dayr al-Qamar in particular. Yasir 'Arafat, according to informed sources, tried to persuade Walid Junblatt that it would be beneficial to revive the dialogue with Dany Sham'un but he has not gotten any final, positive response.

With regard to an alliance with Damascus, the specific elements are lacking at the present time to bring it about because it is not enough for the Liberal Party "to be at odds" with the Phalange to restore normal relations with Syria.

The Possible Alliance Expected by Sham'un

There is still the question of an alliance with President Franjiyah. This could come about but it is still in a purely Christian framework because Dany Sham'un refuses to resume any dialogue with Prime Minister Rashid Karami who he regards as responsible for what happened during the 2-year war and, because of this position, categorically refused to visit him while he was in the north.

The fact is that there are attempts underway to create "some sort of a front or grouping" in which Dany Sham'un would be one of the key people since it has become difficult to relaunch relations with the Phalange despite the efforts being made along this line by Deputy Amin al-Jumayyil. During the latter's meetings with Dany Sham'un a few days ago, he took pains to emphasize the necessity of halting the media campaigns and resuming a dialogue in a calm climate, stressing that any solution must preserve the honor of all parties concerned.

However, in the view of observers, the real thing stopping the establishment of any new alliances at the present stage is that President Sham'un is continuing to hold to his positions toward the Phalange Party and is keeping a dialogue going with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. As long as he has not cut off the dialogue, the establishment of any new alliance or front with his son Dany as one of the key players would be ineffective because

President Sham'un is still the flagship for the real Christian leadership and no one but he can take any fundamental or decisive position. The former president is still keeping an eye on the situation and, in anticipation of developments, has made no final decision.

Phalangist observers feel that given the present "no position" situation, Sham'un may be able to extract some "profits" from the Phalange which he might have lost or might be unable to extract were he to adopt a final position, whether negative or positive. Accordingly, for him to stay in al-Ashrafiyah and not to leave it is profiting him a lot and is making the Phalange take care to be responsive to him because, were he to decide to leave al-Ashrafiyah for another area, the Phalange would then lose a lot of the political cover it is still enjoying because of Sham'un's non-negative stand on what happened. This has prompted the former president to state frankly to the key players in his party that he is stronger politically because he now enjoys the support of those who do not support the Phalange, plus the support of those who originally supported him and the Phalange as well.

Until President Sham'un reaches a final decision, the situation will remain as it is, fluctuating between meetings and contacts and studying solutions and proposals. However there are apprehensions about any military development to which some will turn if the attempts to establish alliances fail and any military action would plunge the country into a civil war, the signs of which are looming on the horizon following the statements by Dany Sham'un which were supported by a number of "the new allies."

What about the position of the state?

On the surface the state is neutral. President Elias Sarkis has stated that he wants to deploy the army to the areas which saw the fighting but he said that this would be done only with the consensus of the parties concerned. He is still awaiting a positive response from the Phalange Party set as a prerequisite for the army to enter "its areas" that the army be deployed in the western area. Until this complication is resolved, Sarkis has been careful to announce that the state rejects any sort of autonomy, as a direct response to the intention of "the Lebanese Forces" to form a national guard, police, etc.

Anticipation of any development, a question remains: Will the contacts now going on behind the scenes be useful in softening the position of Dany Sham'un, restoring the rapprochement between the military wing in the Phalange and Liberal Parties, or will these efforts fail and contact between the Liberals and the Phalange on the political level through the heads of the two parties continue until one of the leaders of the military wings of the two parties is able to overcome the other?

In such a situation, what alliances could be produced by the war between the two parties which was characterized by the radio station of "the Lebanese Forces" as "the 7 July Movement" which it talked about as if it was a rectification movement.

These are questions that may find answers soon.

8389

CSO: 4802

SHIITE LEADER DISCUSSES TRIP TO IRAN, PROBLEM OF SOUTH LEBANON

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 27 Jun 80 pp 12-14

[Interview with Shiite leader Shaykh Muhammad Shams al-Din, by Amin al-Siba'i, in Beirut on 26 Jun 80]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Shams al-Din went on an official visit to Iran to spend 2 weeks beginning on 15 May. He spent a whole month there and was still not able to finish all his business. He will return to Iran to complete discussions he has started and to participate in two conferences that will be held there soon.

Aside from his personal belongings, the vice-chairman of the Higher Islamic Shiite Council carried on his trip a number of files related to several issues. The most important of these, of course, is the "problem of the south [of Lebanon]."

Upon his return to Lebanon last week, his house in al-Dawahh was packed with crowds of clerics and politicians of various denominations. He was showered with questions about the results of his discussions in Iran, especially since these discussions took place with Imam Khomeyni, President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr and other Iranian officials, and involved Islamic and Arab problems, including the Palestinian problem and the dangers threatening south Lebanon.

It took Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din a full week to explain the results of his visit to Iran and answer all questions, despite his urgent need for a period of rest, which he said he will not be able to take before the fall. Those who sought specific answers to their questions actually represented various groups and classes.

When AL-HAWADITH visited him at his home on 26 June with a long list of questions, the vice chairman of the Shiite Council was explaining to a large group of ulema [Islamic scholars] his views on the nature of objective, realistic handling of the crisis in the south and of relations with the government and the Palestinian resistance. He then moved to a circle of delegates from the Ba'labakk area, then to a circle of American University students, and after that, to a succession of groups, including delegations from various areas of the south.

Shaykh Shams al-Din enjoyed answering all the questions. While he was passing on information, his children were offering Iranian sweets made of "Manna," which the Iranians call "Gaz."

In the course of the never-ending questions, one of the ulema asked: "Where does our crisis stand, and how do you see it now in the light of the clashes and incidents that occurred while you were in Iran?"

Shaykh Shams al-Din answered: "The phase of fatalism and defeatism in the ranks and souls of Shiite Muslims is over. It will never return, despite the efforts of some to restore it. We have been reborn and we will continue to grow along diverse but clear lines in an Islamic environment. Our position will not be as proposed early in 1975, but will be a receptive cultural position.

"The second issue is the Arab national question. The state has to aim at wiping out mistakes in the actual conduct of its business, and to provide justice for people in all walks of life. Lebanon is part of the Arab world. AL-HAWADITH published an article I wrote over 2 years ago in which I said in discussing our problem that 'Lebanon is part of the Arab world with equal rights and obligations.'

"The driving force behind this loyalty is a combination of factors, including fear. We hope everybody believes us when we say that we are afraid. We have fears regarding our political fate in the face of the dangers surrounding the south and the dangers of occupation, partition and resettlement [of the Palestinians]. We seriously consider the matter of resettlement to be a real danger which was previously implicit in international maneuvering regarding the Palestinian problem and the Middle East. After "Camp David," resettlement became the principal element in the situation and in the objective of these agreements.

"Reference to the issue of resettlement gives rise to angry reactions or hurt feelings. But we bring it up, not to embarrass or condemn any side, but to warn against it and work to prevent it from happening.

"We would not be the only victims of resettlement. The Lebanese south and its people would not be its only victims. The Palestinian cause itself would also be its victim. This has been said many times but has not been understood very well. Honestly and truly, resettlement would be the graveyard of the Palestinian cause and of justifications for continuing the Palestinian struggle. This is because if resettlement took place here, it would not stop here, but would develop into a basis for a solution [of the Palestine problem] in all the Arab countries. The Palestine question would be done with and would turn into a cause of hollow slogans lacking a popular or political base.

"Resettlement would undoubtedly mark the beginning of a chain reaction all over the Middle East region. I would advise you to refer back to the Sykes-Picot agreement, to the Paris Peace Conference and to the projects to divide

up the region on the basis of sectarian and tribal affiliations. All these projects would be revived by this [Palestinian resettlement] operation. It would be like throwing a rock into a quiet peaceful lake to create new waves which open the way for intervention by the big powers."

We asked Shaykh Shams al-Din: "Is it possible for you to shed more light on the Arab attitude or [sense of] responsibility in this regard?"

[Answer] Unfortunately, the Arab mentality has grown accustomed to hold out in the face of problems until the last minute, and then to try to solve them at any cost, just to create an imaginary sense of relief, even if this generates greater and more serious problems. I imagine that we are now facing our destiny with this kind of mentality.

At least we, in Lebanon, will not allow this type of mentality to prevail. We will never allow that.

[Question] How? What capabilities do you have to confront this situation?

[Answer] The capabilities are that we exist and our political resistance exists. It will be enough for us to say "No," to hold on to our land and to return our refugees to their land despite all opposing forces.

[Question] From a practical point of view and with a few exceptions, the Arab position with regard to south Lebanon appears to be neutral, if this is the right expression. The Palestinian Resistance discussed the resettlement problem during the Damascus conference, and regard some of those who inflate the issue as intent on discrediting the true intentions of the resistance. The Resistance emphasized their clear commitment to refuse all forms of resettlement and to continue the fight to recover the land seized by Israel. What is the practical way to prevent the resettlement from taking place?

[Answer] This is what the Palestinians say, of course, and we are glad to hear it once again. I have heard this several times from the Palestinian brothers. It is important to find the political means to make this talk an existing political reality and not just a media slogan. Of course, I will seize the first opportunity to meet with Palestinian leaders, as there are many things that must be reexamined. The political formula is to refer to the facts. We face a security and political setup in the south which neither serves the political security of the south nor really serves the Palestinian resistance.

We know that the south is currently divided into three zones: The Israeli zone, the U.N. zone, and the Palestinian zone in a specific area. This is one reality. The other reality is that there are at least 200,000 [Lebanese] refugees from the south who live away from it. The frightening thing about this reality is that these people are forced to start a new life from scratch wherever they are now at. This includes economic life, social life,

and adaptation to a new political environment. This is what we call "effective migration." At the same time, these people left behind them a void in the south. In this void, a new life, or parasites will grow. Or, the Israelis will have the political opportunity to deal with a vacant land in the manner that suits them best.

There is another reality which we all face. This is the reality of international political moves in line with "Camp David" and the substitute [schemes] that are currently being prepared. These moves are looking for a solution for the Middle East problem which would safeguard the raw material concessions enjoyed by the Western world. In my opinion, the price of this solution is Lebanon, particularly south Lebanon. We do not want to say that we can perform miracles, but there are possibilities of facing this danger. These possibilities begin with the Lebanese southerner living in the south and remaining on his southern land. If it means his death, let him die in the south. This is our concept of accepting life with minimal security.

Last winter we were faced with the catastrophe of new waves of refugees and campaigns to vacate the south and force its people to face the hazards of a new life elsewhere. We faced the possibility of maximum security in the south. This would mean elimination of any Palestinian presence in the south, and surrender to the political aspirations of imperialism against our Palestinian cause. It would mean fulfillment of the Israelis' wishes. We openly and loudly rejected such maximum security.

We were content with minimum security. This meant that after 30 years of hardship, and until the bitter end, we would continue to bear the dangers, anxieties and responsibilities of the Palestinian problem. It meant continued human, economic and other sacrifices for this problem. Being agreeable to live with a minimal state of security would allow the southern refugees to return to their cities and villages, and restore economic activity to the south, which would give the people work opportunities and a chance to rebuild their lives and hold out.

Steadfastness cannot be achieved by refugees in the streets of Beirut, but from within the south. The existing situation is one of defeat not steadfastness. Refugees are clear proof of defeat, while steadfastness means giving the people a chance to remain on their land and continue living, not safely, but in the shadow of danger. We have practiced steadfastness in the shadow of danger for 30 years, and we are ready to continue to do so for another 30 years. I believe that if we honestly deal with political realities in Lebanon we can find a formula for minimal security through the state and its agencies, if possible, or without the state until it becomes capable of providing it.

The south is now divided into three spheres, has three political identities, has no actual government authority, and lives in the shadow of Israel's refusal to maintain the truce agreement. The Israeli slogan is: "The south

is a land with no master." I believe that by staying put and maintaining the present situation, we actually pave the way to lose the south and offer it as a new hostage to Israel, thus dispersing its people and turning them into refugees. Would this serve the Palestinian cause? Would it serve Arab nationalism? Would it serve the security of the area? I do not think the answer is positive to any of these questions.

The present situation is another defeat for the Palestinian cause and a new defeat for the Arab cause. It will create an atmosphere for sectarian and tribal partition in the area. It mainly serves the American purpose of keeping the area boiling until the late 1980s; until alternative energy sources are discovered to replace oil; or until the area is reorganized in a way that guarantees the continuous flow of petroleum.

Political wisdom is that which avoids catastrophes, not that which runs after them. Political wisdom is that politicians should avoid making mistakes, not make mistakes under the influence of imaginary success, and later try to remedy the results of such "success," as Arab politicians have done in the past. They tried to remedy disappointments in Palestine in 1936. Then they tried to remedy them with defeats in 1948, followed by setbacks in 1956, and disaster in 1967. It seems to me that the Arab mentality continues to subject reality to a romantic or poetic approach. The sad thing is that, in the past, this mentality was guided by morality and honesty. But now, I am sorry to say, it has lost the sense of honesty even with itself. Its characteristics have become hypocrisy and deceit, rather than innocence and honesty.

[Question] Your visit to Iran was long and took place during difficult Lebanese and Arab situations. It raised various questions which call for clarification of the truth and revelation of the results of your discussions with Imam Khomeyni and other Iranian high officials about the situation in south Lebanon and the possibility of finding new formulas to deal with this crisis.

[Answer] I begin with the results of the visit to say that, thank God, it was very successful. It received all the necessary political (answers?). Our visit to Imam Khomeyni and his welcome was one of our great pleasures. The meeting was characterized by great concern and exceptional care on the part of Khomeyni, which exceeded our expectations. He clearly and firmly revealed his great and continuing concern about the provision of security to Muslims in Lebanon, and, in particular, to Muslims in South Lebanon, as it is the area exposed to danger. All Iranian leaders share this same care and concern. They realize very well that any dangers affecting the destiny of south Lebanon would not stop at the Lebanese borders, but would spread to the rest of the area. They feel that these dangers cannot be resisted with hollow fantasies, but with effective action based on reality. Any political action must be based on facts.

[Question] Did Imam Khomeyni and the Iranian officials contemplate any definite moves relating to south Lebanon?

[Answer] They see the Israeli threat to the south as one of the leading threats to which they themselves are exposed, because the Israeli danger is a danger to the whole region. The weakest point is the south of Lebanon. They are willing to face this danger the way we decide to face it. The Iranian minister of foreign affairs clearly expressed the Iranian view when he visited Lebanon. Understanding the situation would never mean making peace with Israel. It means confrontation, but it must be confrontation which takes into account the objective dictates of reality.

[Question] You just said that the southern Lebanese refugee must return to his land. This would require the availability of the necessary resources to hold out, such as weapons, economic aid, political action, and the ability to rebuild social life. Without these elements, the southerner can neither bear the woes of war, hold out and fight resettlement and partitioning, or support the Palestinian struggle. How can the southerner be induced to return [to the south], and what are the possibilities of his getting help? Is he going to be urged to revolt or embark on a holy war?

[Answer] Yes. The southerners will return, and it is their duty to do so. With what spirit will they return? They will return with a defiant spirit, not the spirit of someone who is going to lead an easy life. They will have what we called the minimum level of security which allows steadfastness. We have to think first of use of the resources of the Lebanese state to support this steadfastness. This is a matter which we have previously discussed with the government and will work on now. The government has enough funds allocated to the south. We are not satisfied at all with the way these funds are spent. We believe that these funds should be allocated to civil defense organizations and to build a steadfast life, not for peaceful development. The responsibility of supporting steadfastness is ours as individuals and as a state. Of course, steadfastness has a religious war connotation; there should be no doubt about that. But we must understand, and hope our brothers inside and outside Lebanon will also understand, that this religious war readiness also serves as a positive element in Lebanese politics. This does not mean alienation from others, but the addition of a spiritual element that will add vitality to steadfastness and Lebanese safety. What is Iran's role? Of course, our brothers in Iran know and declare that their duty is to be ready and present in this domain.

[Question] What kind of presence?

[Answer] What kind of presence are you asking about?

[Question] Presence means the presence of men, or of material support, or of moral or other type of support. Does it not?

[Answer] We have repeatedly stated with regard to the presence of men, that we are not in need of the element of men to defend the south. In Iran, they are aware of their political responsibility with regard to the political fate of Lebanon, and the fate of the Muslims of Lebanon in particular. This is a very clear point in their minds. I say that the south

is the object of attention by virtue of its being Lebanese as well as Muslim. They are aware that the south is not in need of men to defend it, because its own men who are concerned about it will be in charge of its protection.

[Question] How do you visualize the new relationship with the Palestinian resistance in the light of the consequences of the clashes that occurred in the southern suburb of Beirut while you were in Iran?

[Answer] I was following the sad news from the suburbs of Beirut practically on a daily basis. They were, of course, painful and very frightening. There were similar incidents in the past, and I am afraid there will be more in the future, as long as some groups aim at and seek to kill the new spirit of rebirth I talked to you about at the beginning of this interview. Through propaganda and assaults, it is intended to turn two political illusions into facts which can be easily exploited. The first illusion is repeatedly raised on diverse occasions in relation to a Sunni-Shiite sectarian problem. The second illusion is also frequently aired with regard to a Shiite-Palestinian problem. There is constant pressure to stir up rumors about the existence of a Shiite-Sunni problem and a Shiite-Palestinian clash. These are all illusions which some try to turn into facts. I say with absolute confidence, as I have already said to some political leaders, that there is no sectarian crisis or problem among the Muslims. The simple Muslim does not carry within himself any political problem. These are all illusions that some politicians have, because they can only survive by using scare tactics and appointing themselves as protectors of one sect or another. I say to those: "The Muslims are in good shape. The gentle, simple Muslims who espouse the cause of Islam do not base their political beliefs on being Sunnis or Shiites. Their thinking may be related to the region or environment they live in. But, in general, they think as Muslims and as Lebanese. I view with great suspicion the stirring up of fears over Islamic unity. Muslim politicians are called upon to work with one another as Muslims. Their groups should not work against one another as if each group represented a different nation, creating rifts and scars among the people. I am confident of the safety of the unity of Muslims in Lebanon--ideological, cultural as well as political. We are working to protect this unity and to express it in various ways.

The second illusion is the Shiite-Palestinian problem. There is a southern problem related to the security of the Lebanese southerner, whatever religion or sect he may belong to. In the Bika', there is no Shiite problem of destiny. In the south, there is a Lebanese, not a Shiite problem of destiny. The Shiites exist not only in south Lebanon, but throughout the country's regions. Why do people talk about a problem between the Shiites and the Palestinians? The problem in the south is a result of the particulars of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It also arises from the fact that Palestine is on the borders of Lebanon. Since the majority of the Lebanese southerners are Shiites, they are the ones who are the most affected by this problem. This brings us to our call to condition Palestinian

activity in the south. I say frankly that the purpose of this is not to force the Palestinians out of the south. Its purpose is to ensure a minimum level of security, to overcome the dangers of living there, and to live with the intention of holding out. I cannot ignore the fact that we do have a problem, but we did not create it. We have to face it with the objective facts that we have frequently overlooked in the past. We have often thought that we could bypass these facts only to discover at the end that we cannot.

The southern-Palestinian relationship will [always] exist. It will be governed by considerations of Jihad, steadfastness and loyalty to the Palestinian cause. But to be able to stay in control of this relationship and to direct it along a national and Islamic course, our Palestinian brothers must assist us. We cannot work alone to keep this relation strong and sound. We need their help to remain the advocates of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and remain capable of inducing ourselves and our people to pay the tax for steadfastness and bear its consequences in terms of human and economic risks. As to the clashes that have taken place, I have conclusively determined that we were the victims. We were attacked. The only thing is that this time we did not keep quiet. Of course, we have bitter criticism for some of those with whom we shared the same trenches. But this criticism will remain in our heart and conscience, and we will not express it to anyone. This method of dealing with each other cannot continue. It would serve no one.

These clashes, in which we were assaulted, were intended to break our new spirit and extinguish it. But this will not happen. We are doing our best to prevent more clashes, even if we are wronged, because we realize that such clashes do not serve national stability, the Islamic cause, or the Palestinian cause. They only serve Israel and the enemies of Islam, be they inside or outside the country. Clashes are not in our interest at all. Everybody knows that since 1975, we, in the Higher Islamic Shiite Council, have not hesitated to toe the most difficult line of not getting involved in unrest, and not taking sides. This is because we believed that political reform to do justice to the Muslims cannot be accomplished through violence, but through civilian political action.

Our stand has not changed. Our involvement in 1975 and the following years will not be repeated. This painful war which takes place every once in a while in Beirut or the south is caused by those who benefit from it. Why are southern villages shelled for no reason? Why is the southerner insulted and his pride and freedom suppressed? Why can't the southerner express his opinion freely and clearly?

Who benefits from this military and intellectual repression? It only serves to promote despair and devilish ideas which cause deep splits within partisans of the same camp and objective. Why is one specific village surrounded and bombed as if it was an enemy village? Why is war declared on a whole quarter or a whole village, if only one person is suspected of doing wrong?

Who does this serve? We know that it serves to continue the discord in Lebanon. It maintains the benefits and effectiveness of those who take advantage of destruction and discord. We will not allow this. We will never allow it. We will not allow the south or the Beirut suburbs to be victimized. There is no power on earth that can force us to accept humiliation or suppression of freedom and dignity. No, we will never allow that. We are exerting every effort to prevent the renewal of abject sedition, and we ask God to help us in this. We also hope all our brothers will help us.

[Question] Dr Waldheim was clear in his last report when he held Sa'd Haddad responsible for obstructing a solution in the south. What is your opinion on the deteriorating situation resulting from the Israeli policy applied by Haddad?

[Answer] The Israeli occupation phenomenon in south Lebanon, called the Sa'd Haddad phenomenon, is the basic cause of the disasters and risks that south Lebanon is subjected to. It gives political and security justification for the continued tragedy of the south. It is a phenomenon that no one should allow to continue and it should be resisted with all means and methods. The first thing we can think of are the reactionary political elements which find ways to justify their silence about this phenomenon inside Lebanon. There are Lebanese political forces which bear a great responsibility for providing justification and cover for the continuation of this phenomenon and finding imaginary reasons for its existence. It should be looked at not as a Lebanese phenomenon of departure from normality, but as a real Israeli occupation covered up by a number of Lebanese who should rectify their attitude. If they do, we will be in a better position to deal with the situation in the south than we are now.

What means does Sa'd Haddad use to spread his influence beyond its strip and into and beyond the UN forces' zone? We are seriously looking into this dangerous reality and reject it as we did from the beginning. We call on all people in Lebanon to stand in the face of this phenomenon and fight it in any possible way to free Lebanon from the Israeli occupation that hides behind the name of Sa'd Haddad.

[Question] What is new in the case of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr?

[Answer] Imam Musa al-Sadr's case was naturally a major topic in all my discussions in Iran with Imam Khomeyni, president Bani-Sadr, government and political leaders in Qum and Tehran, and various Islamic parties and revolutionary guards. Our Iranian brothers consider Imam al-Sadr as one of their deep and main concerns. Adversaries of this case who imagine that the Iranians are not very concerned about it will discover that they are wrong. The difficult questions about this case will be asked by our Iranian brothers. We have to appreciate the great problems that the Islamic revolution is facing in Iran and which sometimes make some people

think that the Imam al-Sadr case has been shelved. I was happy to realize that it was not in the shade, but under a bright light. It is a matter of deep concern and has reached the Majlis and the Islamic Consultative Council. It is and will remain on its agenda. As soon as this council convenes, the Imam's case will be on its agenda among major Iranian and Islamic issues. The investigation committee, which was going to investigate [the Imam's disappearance] and was delayed due to certain complications, will be reestablished to begin its mission. There are many other ideas under discussion regarding this case.

[Question] Is there any new information in Iran about the fate of Imam al-Sadr and his two companions?

[Answer] I cannot specifically say there is information. But if we carefully, or even not so carefully, review Imam Khomeyni's expressions during his talks with us, they clearly point to the fact that Imam Khomeyni has great hope in his heart that Imam Musa al-Sadr is safe. Frankly, he prayed for his safety, saying: "May God keep him safe." We know that Imam Khomeyni does not speak at random. This prayer is only said for the living. Imam Khomeyni, in his elevated position, has access to far more facts and hypotheses than we have.

9455

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RADAR DETECTION OF TERRORISTS--UNIFIL troops in southern Lebanon have recently begun to use sophisticated radar to detect terrorist squads. UNIFIL has over 60 radars in its 8 battalions. Our military correspondent Shmu'el Tal reports: UN troops have recently begun to adopt a firm attitude toward the terrorists in southern Lebanon. They are carrying out ambushes and surprise patrols at day and night even in locations they did not check in the past. The Norwegian soldiers are accompanied by trained dogs in their night patrols and have scored several successes. The latest innovation introduced by UNIFIL is a sophisticated radar to detect forces moving on the ground. As said, the UN has over 60 radars of this kind. They enable UNIFIL's permanent positions and patrols to follow terrorist movement during the day and at night even if they move through wadis. The radar also makes it possible to track vehicles at night and to distinguish between caterpillar vehicles and cars equipped with rubber wheels. The miniature ground radar has a range of several hundred meters, depending on topographic conditions. We were told that the radar is very effective. [Text] [TA231254 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 23 Sep 80]

CSO: 4805

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

DECISIONS AFFECTING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS--Nouakchott, 25 Sep (AFP)--A compulsory annual profit will be set for the public and semi-public corporations in Mauritania, the military committee of national salvation (CMSN), the ruling power of Mauritania, decided at the end of an ordinary session. This measure falls within the framework of the improvement of the operations of public and mixed status corporations, an official communique states. The CMSN on the other hand, has recommended the broadening of the jurisdiction of the special military court of justice so that it can handle acts of embezzlement of public funds, corruption and maladministration. The CMSN also recommended a linking of the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou (northwest) with the international telecommunications network; the development of selective tourism which preserves the cultural, moral and religious values of the society; the integration of the information sector within the process of development strategy, as well as the establishment of a compulsory national service for all young Mauritaniens who wish to continue their studies on the state's account. [Text] [AB251612 Paris AFP in French 0624 GMT 25 Sep 80]

CSO: 4400

SOCIALIST FEDERATION OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DOMESTIC THREATS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 13 Jul 80 p 15

/Article by Khalil al-Taqi: "A Talk with the Syrian Socialist Union Party Assistant Secretary General, Safwan al-Qudsi: What We Are Experiencing Is More Serious Than Assassination Attempts"/

/Text/ Although Mr Safwan Qudsi was not appointed minister in the Syrian Arab Republic cabinet of Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasam formed after the cabinet of Mr Muhammad 'Ali al-Halabi, which resigned in the wake of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party--which political observers considered an important, illuminating prominent point in the history of the party because it came at a time when Syria was going through its most intense struggle domestically and in the Arab and international contexts since the dawn of independence--Safwan Qudsi has not ceased his political activity. Indeed, he has developed it, in order to take care of all details and seek out its true and grave dimensions. Mr al-Qudsi has marshalled his literary resources on behalf of the nation's struggle, from his position as a writer who has a specific vision of Arab nationalism and the unity of the Arab nation.

In a meeting with Mr Safwan Qudsi, editor in chief of the magazine AL-NAWQIF AL-ADABI, which is issued by the Federation of Arab Writers in Syria, and the assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union party, he says:

"What is happening on the Syrian stage, in its capacity as the center of the struggle, and the plotters' goal of trying to destroy it, is more serious than the assassination acts which a wayward group is carrying out against important figures in the country under a factional covering which Syria did not experience in the past, cannot accept at present and will not embrace in the future. It is deeper than the sabotage acts and explosions to which various economic institutions have been exposed since the Egyptian president started his peace voyage and went over to the ranks of the enemies of our Arab nation, alongside racist Zionism and American imperialism.

"Counterrevolution is not just a political term, it is at the same time an intellectual and cultural one.

"In fact I can go beyond that and say that before counterrevolution declares itself in one political form or another, it declares itself in one intellectual and cultural form or another. It starts with an idea and culture in order to end up with a policy.

"In this sense, counterrevolution is preparing for its political outburst with an intellectual and cultural one. It breaks out intellectually and culturally, then politically."

Brainwashing

Mr Safwan Qudsi continued his discussion on the counterrevolution, saying,

"I am trying to state that counterrevolution does not flinch from preparing for its political action through cultural and political action. It disappears from sight politically but always engages in intellectual and cultural activity. When the suitable moment arrives, counterrevolution also starts to pursue its political activity as well.

"Thus one can say that counterrevolution always exists, exists in one form or another, but declares itself politically only after it has prepared the stage. It declares itself only after it has engaged in a group brainwashing process which it carries out in one sector or another.

"I can go a step beyond that and say that, in confronting this counterrevolution, our efforts must proceed along a path which is parallel to our political efforts.

"Why?

"Because as long as the counterrevolution is an intellectual and cultural fact, it will quickly declare itself politically when it finds that the time has become ripe for such a declaration, and the real revolution, which counterrevolution was established only to react to and enter blatant confrontation with, must take into account the fact that political action will be sufficiently effective and influential only when it relies on a clear intellectual and cultural foundation which will result in no form of ambivalence or misunderstanding.

"In order for this intellectual and cultural action, which we say constitutes the natural prelude to political action, to be sufficiently effective and influential, it must be based on a group of facts.

"It is correct that we cannot set ourselves apart from others through fanaticism or one dimensional vision.

"It is also correct that we cannot allow ourselves to be transformed into racehorses with blinkered eyes obsessed with revolving around themselves.

"This is all correct, but it is also correct that we must have clear vision which will allow us to retain our intellectual identity and cultural personality, because, without this identity, without this cultural personality, our political existence will appear fragile and breakable.

"When one of us proceeds to look closely into the written and unwritten history of major revolutions, he quickly puts his hand on a fact, the gist of which is that these revolutions would not have got where they did had they not completed the formulation of their intellectual identity and cultural personality. This intellectual identity and cultural personality are the cornerstone of any revolutionary structure which wishes to achieve major national and social goals. It is the basis of this cultural personality, and the basis of its existence which any political edifice is built upon. Indeed, it is a base without whose existence there can be no decisive political action."

The Shot and the Voice

Mr Safwan Qudsi, continuing his discussion with AL-QABAS, says:

"More than that, counterrevolution is not a political expression of a single intellectual trend, it often is an expression of mutually opposed intellectual trends, which, however, are all in agreement on one goal, which is to bring down the revolution.

"The difference, which is really striking, is that the forces of counterrevolution are in agreement over a single goal which they will not dispute under any circumstance; the goal over which the forces of counterrevolution are in agreement is a stupid hostility to Arab nationalism in all its political and social aspirations and ambitions. It is true that our partisanship of Arab nationalism has various roots, but it is also true that the partisanship is of a force which causes these mutually conflicting and contradictory forces to be in agreement over a single goal, which is to bring down the national socialist revolution.

"After that, let me move on another step and state that it is incumbent on us, in confronting this counterrevolution, to act in two directions at once.

"These two directions are the liquidation of the intellectual and cultural base of the counterrevolution and the construction of the intellectual and cultural base of the national socialist revolution. Indeed, one cannot basically liquidate the intellectual and cultural basis of the /counter/ revolution without starting to build the intellectual and cultural base of the national socialist revolution.

"In a previous discussion I said that the counterrevolution is not just a shot fired from the barrel of a gun but is much greater than that.

"Let us clarify the matter as follows: the shot fired from the barrel of a gun is only the last quarter hour of a 24-hour day. It is the last page of a book which contains hundreds of pages.

"In this sense, one can say that this shot is not the counterrevolution but is the voice by which the counterrevolution declares itself.

"I am trying to say that the counterrevolution is not just a passing fancy, a fleeting fit, temporary stupidity or a momentary technique--it is an organized effort which is ultimately expected to realize a political objective, one result of which will be to turn the table upside down and make us walk on our heads rather than our feet, performing a collective brainwashing and making our muscles grow at the expense of our minds.

"More than that, the counterrevolution is not a random shot in the air but a shot at a specific target, which when it hits it will result in destroying this genuine experiment in national and domestic action, knocking out the sensitive nerves in a body which is trying, as much as it can and is able to do so, to make something of significance. It is a shot in the direction of our national experiment, in which, no matter how much talk is made about it, the positive outweighs the negative. It is a shot in the direction of our social experiment, of which President Hafiz al-Asad has made a statement whose gist is that to build a society with one class, that is, to dissolve the differences between the classes, which was the favored expression of the great leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, is the objective and destination of this experiment."

Rearranging the Chemical Composition of the Arab Mind

Mr Safwan Qudsi continues his talk by saying,

"Then the counterrevolution does not arise in a vacuum. It is founded on an intellectual and cultural base which is founded on reducing the stature of our national values, reducing the significance of our social struggle, and stirring up doubts on the effort exerted to build our national experiment.

"In this sense, the counterrevolution is not a social structure or economic formation alone--it is, first and foremost, an intellectual and cultural structure.

"Building on this statement, one can say that it is through thought and culture that we build, that is, through intellectual structure comes the beginning.

"The social or economic base on which the counterrevolution is founded is not the only thing which one must work to extirpate and uproot; there is

also the intellectual and cultural base. When the counterrevolution succeeds in snaring a given citizen and strengthening a given group, that means we have not given thought and culture the attention they deserve.

"When the counterrevolution proceeds with attempts which are made to rearrange the chemical composition of the Arab mind, when the counterrevolution proceeds in its attempts to carry out a collective brainwashing and when the counterrevolution continues in its efforts to ensnare the Arab mind and deprive it of its history and its national reality:

"When the counterrevolution does all this, the response to it is to smash its intellectual and cultural foundation and build an alternative one, the foundation of national socialist revolution.

"Once again, the counterrevolution is not a social structure, or an economic structure, alone, but, at the same time, is an intellectual structure and a cultural organization.

"When the counterrevolution is an intellectual structure and a cultural organization, venturing on a decisive confrontation with it will take place through reliance on an intellectual structure and cultural organization which will have the effect of extirpating this counterrevolution by its deepest roots, by which I mean the intellectual and cultural ones."

Yes to a Review, Not a Regression

Mr Safwan Qudsi, the assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union party in Syria, talks about the causes which led to the removal of Fawzi al-Kayyali from the party command at the beginning of last May, saying:

"It is not my nature to give in to attempts to force me to change my intellectual and political convictions, and it is not my nature to surrender to any heated efforts to make me decide to change my ideas at the same speed as I change my clothes.

"At a certain time, some people who were afflicted with the symptoms of intellectual and political confusion intended to make attempts of this type, and the effect of yielding to it would have been to make me, in turn, fall under the influence of this political intellectual confusion and consequently to make me move from the position in which I am standing to a totally different one.

"When I was engaged in a dialogue with those certain people on a given subject, I made statements which were limpid in their clarity, namely that I do not adhere to any idea, or any position, except insofar as I possessed the deep-rooted conviction that this idea is still correct to some degree and that this position is still based on solid ground--indeed, I made more intensely clear statements, which were that I was prepared to review my

convictions when I felt that there was something calling for such a review, and when I felt that these convictions were no longer firm in my mind and conscience in a manner which made me most secure in them.

"When I expressed this readiness to conduct this review, I immediately realized that what was expected of me was to regress, not to review. This was beyond what I could bear or endure.

"It is true that I am not like people who are content to be lax in the face of intellectual and political persuasions which do not evolve or change.

"It is true that I am not among the partisans of this intellectual and political certainty, which I view as a malady which we must not allow to destroy our minds and consciousnesses.

"However, it is also true that I am not one of those people who fall lightly under the influence of any form of intellectual and political opportunism, or any style of viewing ideas as being no more than a piece of clothing which we take off and put on whenever we want.

"It was clear that these certain people who were afflicted with this intellectual and political confusion accepted nothing less than that I strip myself of all my convictions and put new ones in my mind which would have the effect of making me a new being which my self would reject and my being would loathe.

"Should I say more than that?

"Should I say that this intellectual and political confusion prompted those certain people who were afflicted with it to declare ideas and positions of which the least that could be said is that their links with their national roots are severed?

"Shall I say that this political and intellectual confusion has made these certain people continue to exert efforts which it is hoped will spread this confusion to every mind by contagion?

"Shall I state that this intellectual and political confusion has caused these people to proceed to make efforts which it is hoped will cause a given party organization to reject its history, to turn itself inside out and to leave its skin?

"However, some of us still are immune from this intellectual and political confusion.

"If a given head has been afflicted by this confusion, many other heads are still able to retain their equilibrium.

"This is exactly what happened on 1 May 1980 when new leadership was formed for the Arab Socialist Union in Syria."

INTERNAL SECURITY SEEN AS GOVERNMENT'S TOP PRIORITY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 18 Jul 80 p 26

/Article: "Field Courts Paralyze the Brothers!"/

/Text/ The statements Western papers have made to the effect that the Syrian regime has begun seeking the aid of security officials from the Soviet Union to quieten the domestic disturbances which were aggravated recently may not be true, but it is true that the severe measures the regime has taken have started to do their work in stabilizing the security situation and paralyzing the Moslem Brothers' activities.

It was clear, from the formation of the field courts and the People's Assembly vote on the law to execute the Moslem Brothers, that the Syrian government is putting the security question at the top of the priorities. The strict punishments, in which there is no leniency, do not just fall on active persons belonging to the Society of Moslem Brothers but are indeed the lot of their relatives, family, aides and others who are dependent on them. This intensified activity has had a noticeable effect on domestic security, especially since the government also considers ordinary people responsible for security and requests them to pursue any element who might be suspected of having a hand in sabotage activities in public places.

Before the law was issued and put into effect, Syrian security agencies conducted broad dragnet operations involving the cities of Aleppo and Hume and most northern towns, a number of people were arrested, arms caches were discovered and diverse skirmishes occurred in which dozens of people were killed or wounded.

It appears that the dragnet operation was so extensive that it encompassed other opposition people besides the Moslem Brothers. Some of these opposition figures, who had no connection with terrorist activity, believe that the latest security laws will embrace them in the end because the charge of membership in the Society of Moslem Brothers is hard to prove, especially in exceptional circumstances like these.

The Syrian regime chose the execution law and intensification of security in making use of a group of factors which cause it to refrain from acting

were literally toward other forces or from giving concessions to opposition forces when are not affiliated with the brothers. It realizes that national forces, either participating in the progressive front or outside it, are condemned to support and reaffirm the security measures the government is taking against the Moslem Brothers, however intense they may become. It also knows that Iraq and groups in sympathy with it cannot support the Moslem Brothers' movement, since that poses a similar danger to them. What the al-D 'wan Party in Iraq gets at the hands of Iraqi security agencies is no less intense than what the Moslem Brothers get at the hands of the Syrian security agencies. The Syrian regime itself has not referred to Iraq either secretly or openly in this context. When President Hafiz al-Asad declared at the Perseverance and Steadfastness Summit held in Tripoli last April that neighboring countries were involved in stirring up unrest within Syria, stating "I prefer not to enter into a war of words with these countries but have decided to crush the reactionary forces in Syria itself," some people thought he was referring to Iraq. However, Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddan soon mentioned Jordan by name, saying that his country had categorical proof that the Society of Moslem Brothers receives its training in Jordanian camps. However, Jordanian officials who visited Damascus recently returned with another impression, the gist of which is that the charge was not directed against them.

Various rumors also state that quantities of weapons have found their way into Syria from Lebanon.

What applies to the Syrian regime's position on Iraq concerning the Moslem Brothers applies to its position on Saudi Arabia. It did not refer to Saudi Arabia strongly or fleetingly in this context, although the British conservative newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH pointed to what it called "Saudi hands in the Syrian disturbances." However, observers in London do not take this talk seriously but consider it part of the touchiness between Britain and Saudi Arabia that arose recently from the crisis over the film "Death of a Princess."

It may be inferred from the corpus of press and diplomatic reports being circulated in Western capitals that President Hafiz al-Asad has succeeded in establishing order and security in Syria. A British diplomat who has worked in the Middle East for a long time states that the Syrian regime, by the standards of the Middle East, is a relatively stable one because it has stayed in power the longest. The length of duration in power is the soundest criterion of stability, regardless of the miscellaneous events which may occur here and there in corresponding patterns of time. What has helped it, in his estimation, is the lack of a reliable alternative. The regime is strong because the opposition is weak; even if the regime is weak, the opposition is weaker.

There is a feeling on President al-Asad's part, as those knowledgeable about the inner nature of things in Syria say, that his campaign to liquidate the Moslem Brothers is one aspect of the problem and while he

has given it priority because of its security repercussions, he has not ignored the other side, which involves the pursuit of a difficult, painful cosmetic operation on the ruling party's agencies. It is stated that the investigating committee on unlawful gain will resume its activity now that Mr Ahmad Dhiyab has resigned from the chairmanship of it, because of his inability to rid the country of bribery and corruption, and Mr 'Abdallah al-Ahmar has taken his place. Reliable Syrian sources say that al-Ahmar may also resign from the committee after a conflict with a German company which was to have executed a contract for 4.5 million German marks to outfit the Ba'th House in Damascus with furniture and aluminum partitions which caused the Syrian government to proceed to abrogate the contract although Ba'th House was to have been a model modern building.

The German company, known by the name MFVB, claims that it paid a commission of 700,000 Syrian pounds to get this contract, but so far only the payment of 200,000 Syrian pounds has been proved, to the engineer Ghassan Taraqqi, who is said to have arranged the deal, causing the Syrian government to abrogate the contract in its entirety without cause.

It is said that the Syrian government has decided to ride a difficult vessel in dealing with the internal situation, whether that be the committee to liquidate the Moslem Brothers or the committee to clean house from within, now that it has become clear that foreign remedies will not work. Because of the domestic situation in Lebanon and Iran, the possibility that an effective Syrian-Iranian-Palestinian alliance may be created which could upset the balance of forces in the region has become weak. Foreign pressures to which Jordan has been exposed because of the Camp David agreement have in turn reduced the possibility that the Jordanian-Syrian alliance might be revived as it existed some years ago. Above and beyond that, there are the disturbed relations between Syria and Iraq since last July, following the collapse of the union talks between the two countries and Saddam Husayn's rise to power as a result of broad party purges. At the time Baghdad said that was a plot in which the Syrians had a hand, though the Syrians deny this and state that it was the Jordanians who provoked the Iraqis against them!

With the success of the Syrian regime's campaign against the Moslem Brothers, the refrain in the west to the effect that Syria is determined to sign exceptional agreements with the Soviet Union to cope with domestic foreign dangers has let up, in spite of the increasing number of Soviet military and non-military delegations to Damascus. Perhaps this was one of the reasons which prompted the Syrian regime to adopt the decision to make a decisive confrontation itself, to prove that it was still able to cope with the situation domestically and abroad.

It is apparent from this that the Syrian regime has transcended the latest crisis, to which it has devoted great efforts over the past year.

Nonetheless, many are anticipating developments, foremost among them the corrective measures President al-Asad is said to be busy studying as a prelude to executing them.

SYRIA

BRIEFS

JAPANESE VEHICLES--The Japanese Mitsubishi automobile manufacturing organization declared yesterday that it won a 3.5-billion yen (\$16 million) contract with the Syrian Board of Machinery and Equipment Trade, by virtue of which it will export 450 passenger vehicles and trucks to Syria. The vehicles are to be shipped next September. Mitsubishi pointed out that the vehicles will be used in transporting Syrian agricultural products to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and countries bordering on Syria.
/Text/ /Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Jul 80 p 15/ 11887

CSO: 4802

AGRICULTURE IS PRONOUNCED TOP NATIONAL PRIORITY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Moncef Ben Hadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, chaired on Friday in Soliman a regional sectorial conference on agricultural development organized by the Nabeul Coordination Committee to discuss irrigated crops in Cap-Bon.

During the opening session--held in the presence of the governor and the Coordination Committee secretary general--Moncef Bel Hadj Amor underlined the importance of agriculture in view of the key role it plays in the national economy. It is a fact that the agricultural sector alone employs half of the country's labor force.

The minister mentioned how interested the party and government are in developing that sector and how the head of state is anxious to turn agriculture into the country's green weapon.

This solicitude explains the importance that our development plans attach to agriculture with a view to guarantee our food supplies and promote our exports of agricultural goods.

Expansion of Irrigated Areas

In this connection, the minister specifically mentioned the government's efforts in the sphere of investments which are constantly increasing, so much so that 810 million dinars were invested during the 10-year period now ending compared to 272 millions invested during the sixties.

He noted that 38 percent of these investments went into irrigation. The remaining 62 percent was allocated to agricultural machinery, afforestation and livestock.

Bel Hadj Amor pointed out that these efforts had led to an expansion of the irrigated areas, now covering 200,000 hectares, and to a 50 percent increase in the agricultural production.

Consequently, during this last decade the average production of olive oil amounted to 115,000 tons compared to 55,000 tons in the sixties. During that same period, a similar rate of growth was registered in the production of citrus fruits which jumped from an average of 77,000 tons to 140,000 tons.

As for farming in Cap-Bon, the minister stressed its importance given that area's contribution to the development of the country's economy and given the essentially agricultural character of that region which is famous for the diversity of its production and for the vast expanse of its arable lands (174,000 hectares of arable lands out of a total area of 290,000 hectares).

Agricultural Loans: Substantial Reduction of Administrative Formalities

But this expansion is curtailed by the water shortage in that region since its yearly water requirements amount to 90 million cubic meters. In this connection, the minister said that a project to bring water from the north into the Cap-Bon area, a project included in the plan, will improve the water situation without completely solving the problem mainly because the water requirements of the various sectors are always increasing.

In this connection, Bel Hadj Amor urged local farmers and experts to resort to methods of artificial irrigation which allow a more efficient utilization of the existing water supplies. He pointed out if they used the method of irrigation by sprinklers they could cut down consumption by 40 percent while increasing production. Other methods of irrigation, such as utilization of residual waters from purification plants, could also be used.

The minister went on to speak about the agricultural loans policy and said that the new trend adopted by the government is to authorize banks and their local branches to grant loans to farmers with considerably less administrative formalities.

He stressed the role which these institutions are being called upon to play by giving guidance to the farmers.

Sixth Plan: Agriculture Gets Preferential Treatment

On the subject of the decentralization of the services of the agriculture department, Moncef Bel Hadj Amor started by recalling the measures recently adopted to bring the department of agriculture closer to the field noting that with the new allocation of senior cadres throughout regional offices more than 78 percent of those cadres will now be working in the regions. The remaining 22 percent of those cadres will continue to work in the central administration.

This step is part of the policy to give guidance to the farmers and to popularize modern farming methods.

After noting that the government has given preferential treatment to agriculture in the forthcoming plan encouraging that sector and providing the means to guarantee a stable and decent income for the farmers, the minister mentioned the changes registered in agricultural wages and in production. The purpose of these changes is to maintain a balance between the interests of the producers and those of the consumers.

Among the reforms envisaged by the next plan, Bel Hadj Amor mentioned the project to restructure the marketing distribution chain. For instance, the price of some agricultural products will be set even before the season gets underway. Also, a balance will be established between imports and exports of agricultural products on the basis of the needs of our domestic market and our foreign markets requirements.

To Make Our Agriculture More Competitive

The minister emphasized the need to make our Tunisian agricultural products more competitive in foreign markets in general, and in the markets of Arab countries in particular, as well as the need to attract Arab investors to agricultural projects in Tunisia to insure that our products are better represented in the markets of our brother countries.

The minister devoted the second half of his speech to the question of the administrative reform aimed, he said, at bringing the administration closer to its beneficiaries. On this subject, he said that it was necessary to work together to ensure the successful outcome of this reform.

Finally, he said that he was certain that all the interested parties along with the representatives of national organizations and local authorities will not spare any effort to achieve the development goals which we have set ourselves in conformity with the directives of the Supreme Commandant.

At the end of the meeting, the participants sent a message of support to the president of the republic.

8796

CSO: 4400

YOUTH URGED TO CONTRIBUTE TO PARTY OBJECTIVES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 2 Sep 80 p 5

(Text) Rachid Sfar, member of the Political Bureau and minister of public health, chaired on Sunday evening, at the Palace of Congresses in Monastir, the opening session of the Fourth Conference of the Socialist Destour Youth which is meeting from 31 August to 3 September under the theme "An Effective Participation in Political Life."

The opening session was attended by Abdessalem Dimassi, secretary general of the U/OJ [Tunisian Federation of Youth Organizations]; Mohsen Chaminade, secretary general of the Destour Youth National Bureau; by the governor, the secretary general of the Coordination Committee and representatives of large national organizations with offices in the governorate of Monastir.

Rachid Sfar started by conveying to the conference participants greetings from the Supreme Combattant, from the party secretary general and from members of the government and of the Political Bureau.

He then asked the participants to observe a minute of silence in memory of the martyrs of Monastir who died on 31 August 1953 on the field of honor under the bullets of the colonial authorities.

The minister also pointed out that the closing session of this Fourth Conference will take place on the anniversary of 3 September 1934, the day when the leader Habib Bourguiba was deported to southern Tunisia, a measure which signaled the beginning of the demonstration of force launched by the Neo-Destour against the supporters of the protectorate.

Rachid Sfar also remarked that the conference had opened on the anniversary of that day, in 1955, when documents were exchanged granting internal autonomy to Tunisia. In this connection, he urged the Tunisian youths to muse over the lesson contained in all these historic events which illustrate the perspicacity and political genius of the Supreme Combattant.

Then, the minister underlined the importance of the current period in Tunisia's history now that the next development plan is getting its finish-

ing touches, a plan--he said--that calls for the united effort of us all if it is to be carried out. He noted that on that score the Destour youth has been assigned a crucial task and has the duty of always standing on the frontline of the militants setting an example for other groups of young Tunisians.

Mr Sfar went on to declare his certainty that the Fourth Youth Conference will not fail to achieve results calculated to increase the party's influence and to enable the Socialist Destour Youth Organization to continue acting as the designated spearhead in the political and civic education of young people, as the uniting element of the living forces of the nation to further increase the ranks of the party.

He also emphasized the great responsibility assumed by this organization to defend the Destour options and to mobilize the youth in the party arena.

The minister of public health also said that he was very pleased to see that an overwhelming majority of the people favors the development strategy adopted by the party and he pointed out that the Destour youth has the duty to constantly enrich its own Destour culture and consolidate its education so as to be in step with progress and contribute to the implementation of the party programs and objectives.

All the same, Mr Sfar pointed out that neither the state nor the party claim to have arrested all facets of under-development, nor have they given concrete form to all the aspirations but, nonetheless, they are driven by a firm determination to fill the gaps and to eliminate the last effects of underdevelopment. "Although we still have a long way to go on the road that leads to the final takeoff," he said at the end of his address, "The fact that we now have enough cadres capable of leading the march of development under the best possible conditions is a good reason to feel optimistic."

Earlier, Mohamed Ben Nasr, Abdessalem Dimassi, Mohsen Gheminade and Khelifa Jebiniani, the conference chairman, spoke to the participants emphasizing the importance of this Fourth Conference of the Socialist Destour Youth in the decisive period through which the country is living in its effort to become a developed country and they underscored the role assigned to young people for the success of this endeavor.

Afterwards, Rachid Sfar paid a visit to the mausoleum of the martyrs of Monastir where he recited the Fatiha in memory of the martyrs of the events of August 1953.

8796

CSO: 4400

•

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

INTERIOR MINISTRY NEWS--The Ministry of Interior has decided to send Lt Col Hamid Sayf Hamid Rashid, deputy director of the Sharjah Police, to England to attend the Chiefs of Police Seminar to be held at the Police Training Academy in Brahm's Hill from 29 September to 12 December 1980. The Minister of Interior appointed Maj Rashed Salem al-Shamlan as deputy director for security affairs at the Ministry of Interior, in addition to his present position as director of the Department of Criminal Investigation and Research. The following 9 police officers and warrant officers will be sent to Jordan to attend a 6 weeks' training course on criminal investigations beginning 15 September 1980: 1st Lt Jum'ah Sayf 'Obayd (al-Fujayrah police); 2nd Lts Hassan Sa'id (Sharjah), Saleh Salem (Ra's al-Khaymah), 'Obayd al-Asli (Dubai), and Sa'id al-Misbah (Umm al-Qaywayn); Chief Warrant Officer Muhammad Gharir (Department of Naturalization and Immigration). [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 24 Sep 80 p 4]

CSO: 4802

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

SAWR FIGHTERS CLAIM VICTORIES--The Saharan People's Liberation Army continues its just armed struggle for freedom and complete sovereignty over its own country. A communique issued by the SADR Information Ministry today said that the Saharan fighters on 23 September shelled the Moroccan garrison in Mziriga in southern Morocco for 15 minutes using heavy artillery. The concentrated shelling caused heavy human and material losses to the invaders. The Saharan communique also stated that the Saharan fighters on 24 September attacked for 45 minutes the royalist Moroccan forces stationed in Lemcid and inflicted considerable losses on them. [Text] [LD291646 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 29 Sep 80]

CSO: 4402

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

October 15, 1988

D.S.